

MEMOS
Mon 5PM

Political Science Y673: Conflict and Governance Spring 2001

Meets Wed., 1-3 PM, 513 N. Park

Instructor: **Michael McGinnis**, Woodburn 366
Office Hours: Mon. 2:00-3:30 and by appointment
855-8784, mcginnis@indiana.edu

Coping with conflict (both internal and external) is one of the primary tasks facing governments or more informal modes of governance. All communities must develop institutions that facilitate the resolution of disputes before they escalate to widespread violence. The responsibility of protecting the community against external dangers is delegated to agents who may abuse this position by manipulating fears of exaggerated dangers or by instigating real dangers by their own actions. Communities have devised diverse patterns of governance to cope with many different forms of conflict, and new patterns of governance are in the process of development. (For example, the constitution of international order may be fundamentally transformed by such processes as the steady expansion of democratic polities, the growth of the EU as a new form of European sovereignty, and the establishment of international criminal jurisprudence.) Although the institutions of domestic politics and international relations are typically considered separately, in this seminar we will use the tools of institutional analysis to examine connections between internal and external conflict, at various levels of aggregation.

The following topics will be examined in this seminar: the predatory and polycentric constitutional orders envisioned in Hobbes' *Leviathan* and the *Federalist* and their application to instances of development; linkages among local, national, and global conflict; how disputes over resource management can lead to violence; comparison of alternative conflict resolution institutions, including "private" and "public" international law; complementarity of market and public economies; consideration of whether economic models of production and exchange can be extended to cover theft and charity; the institutional and cultural foundations of democratic peace as a multi-level system of conflict management; Tocqueville's concern with the difficulty of sustaining democratic self-governance and its implications for the democratic peace; models of ethnic conflict as a rational response to fear and to problems of credible commitment to protect minority rights; greed and grievance as sources of contemporary conflict; and linkages among resource conflict, humanitarian aid, and development. The common theme uniting these diverse topics should become clearer as the semester proceeds!

This seminar is part of a two-semester sequence on Institutional Analysis and Development. (Either course can be taken independently of the other.) The fall semester version focuses on micro and intermediate levels of analysis and the spring semester on more macro-level patterns of governance. Processes at the micro and macro levels are, ultimately, connected in fundamental ways, but there remain important differences in the modes of analysis that are most appropriate for each level. In this seminar, we examine both classic works of political philosophy and contemporary social scientific analyses. We endeavor to illustrate by example how diverse modes of understanding can be integrated.

This seminar will draw upon literatures from various subfields of political science, especially international relations, policy, and theory and methods. Students and other seminar participants will be encouraged to pursue those literatures of most direct interest to their own program of study. Students will write an original research paper to be presented at a mini-conference held at the end of the semester. They will also be asked to comment upon the assigned readings in weekly memos and a final essay.

Mini-Conference Paper. Each student (and other seminar participants) will complete an original research paper for presentation at the Mini-Conference, to be held Saturday, April 28, and Monday afternoon, April 30. Someone other than the author will be assigned the responsibility to present and comment on each paper. The author will have an opportunity to respond to these comments, and the remainder of the time will be available for general discussion of that paper and the more general issues it may raise. Each student should be concerned about how to revise and improve the quality of his or her paper after the seminar ends, with the goal of moving the work to publication. The Mini-Conference is a way of learning to participate in an intellectual community and coming to appreciate the general coherence of intellectual discourse. Since copies of each paper will be distributed to all Mini-Conference participants, papers must be completed well in advance. We give students two options: (1) If you turn in your completed paper by the due date (April 18), in class, the Workshop will pay all photocopying costs. (2) If you want an extra week, you will have to submit 30 copies by class time, April 25.

Memos. In order to facilitate class discussion, students will be asked to submit short memos commenting on some important aspect of that week's readings or on other issues of basic concern (including exploring ideas for their research paper). Please do not summarize the readings! Instead, move directly to making some important point, worthy of further discussion in class. The class will be divided into two groups, with each group assigned memos for alternating weeks. (Details will be worked out during class.) Students are encouraged to keep their comments in these memos (NOT papers!) brief and to the point. An e-mail distribution list will be set up, and students will be expected to read comments written by their classmates before class begins. It has been our experience that weekly memos greatly enhance the quality of class discussions by giving students an opportunity to articulate their responses.

Final Essay. In hopes of helping students draw this diverse material together, they will be asked to submit (the final week, April 25) a memo in response to a take-home essay question distributed the week before. This assignment will ask the students to reflect upon the themes covered in this course.

Schedule of Topics and Reading Assignments

Week 1: January 10. General Orientation to Institutional Analysis

This week's readings are intended to give seminar participants a taste of what lies ahead. Searle succinctly states the need for social scientists and policy analysts to examine what he calls "institutional facts." Without some understanding of the rules and understandings within which actors act, much of their behavior is unlikely to be interpretable. Vincent Ostrom highlights the importance of seeing institutional analysis and design as a work of art, in the sense of creative combination and recombination of fundamental themes and goals. Finally, the introduction to Tocqueville's classic *Democracy in America* sets forth the basic problem of institutional design underlying that experiment in constitutional order. We will read the rest of this book later in the semester, and students are encouraged to read and reread this classic.

Searle, John. 1969. "The Distinction Between Brute Facts and Institutional Facts." In *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 50-53.

Ostrom, Vincent. 1999. "Artisanship and Artifact." In *Polycentric Governance and Development*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 377-93. [IU Bookstore]

Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1988. "Author's Introduction." *Democracy in America*. HarperCollins. [IU Bookstore]

Week 2: January 17. Methodological Individualism and Social Order

We begin, as always, with Hobbes. From his work we take the basic assumption of methodological individualism and apply it to understand the problematic sources of social order. But this does not mean that we need to agree completely with his conclusion that unitary sovereignty is the only feasible form of constitutional order. Vincent Ostrom describes this reliance on coercive power as a "Faustian bargain" that need not take the shape Hobbes envisions. Still, Hobbes' analysis cannot be ignored.

Hobbes, Thomas. 1994. *Leviathan*. Hackett Publishing [minimal readings: Introduction, Author's Introduction, chapters 1-7, 10-19, 22, 24, 29-31, 39, 43, Review and Conclusion]. [IU Bookstore]

Supplemental: Ostrom, Vincent. 1997. *The Meaning of Democracy and the Vulnerability of Democracies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press [Introduction, 1-30; chapter 5, 119-50].

Week 3: January 24. Constitutional Order and Polycentric Governance in the United States

The constitutional order established in the United States is the subject of this week's readings. Selections from *The Federalist* lay out the basic decision problem confronting the founding generation.

Pay particular attention to the first nine papers, which constitute a quite solid introduction to realism in international relations theory. Although most of this work critically examines the details of the proposed constitution, these early papers set the stage by placing this new, relatively weak nation in the context of a threatening environment. Vincent Ostrom's book draws out the underlying logic of the political theory underlying this constitutional order, and his classic article with Tiebout and Warren introduces the crucially important concept of polycentricity. Note how the system of constitutional order covered in this week's readings strives to make constructive use of conflict, rather than trying to suppress it entirely.

Hamilton, Jay, and Madison. 1992. *The Federalist*. Charles E. Tuttle [minimal readings 1-11, 14-17, 24-26, 39-40, 51, 53, 55, 58, 70-73, 78]. [IU Bookstore]

Ostrom, Vincent. 1987. *The Political Theory of a Compound Republic: Designing the American Experiment*, 2nd edition. ICS Press. [IU Bookstore]

Ostrom, Vincent, Charles M. Tiebout, and Robert Warren. 1961. "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry." *American Political Science Review* 55 (December): 831-42. [Workshop Reprint R61-1; Reprinted in Michael D. McGinnis, ed., *Polycentricity and Local Public Economies* and in Vincent Ostrom, *The Meaning of American Federalism*.]

Week 4: January 31. Alternative Patterns of Constitutional Order and Development

Hobbes and the authors of *The Federalist* have very different constitutional orders in mind. The assigned selections from *Polycentric Governance and Development* illustrate the ways in which these two different conceptualizations affect processes of development, especially with respect to Africa. International aid agencies have long striven to help less developed nations improve their standard of living and to change their modes of governance. Gardner and Waller provide a bracing overview of the ways in which corruption and related problems can adversely affect the implementation of development aid. Their analysis is especially relevant to Vincent Ostrom's chapter on cryptoimperialism.

McGinnis, Michael; ed. 1999. *Polycentric Governance and Development*, Introduction, chapters 7-8, 10-11, 15. [IU Bookstore]

Gardner, Roy, and Christopher J. Waller. 2000. "Incentives in Strategic Interactions Involving an International Development Cooperation Agency." Technical Appendix in SIDA Report.

Week 5: February 7. Basic Conceptual Frameworks and Analytical Tools

This week's readings cover different but related conceptual frameworks that participants in this seminar are very likely to find relevant for their own research projects. Elinor Ostrom provides an overview of the IAD framework developed over many years by scholars associated with the Workshop. Lake and Powell's volume represents an effort by several prominent IR scholars to lay out

an integrated perspective on the application of game theory to their field. Of particular interest is their effort to connect the preferences and actions of individual and collective actors at different levels of aggregation. Putnam's article on two-level games has become a modern classic, clearly showing how international relations and comparative politics scholars could both improve their own research by learning from each other. More generally, his model stands as an exemplar of how any analyst might connect processes occurring at different levels or scales of aggregation.

Ostrom, Elinor. 1999. "Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework." In *Theories of the Policy Process*, ed. Paul A. Sabatier. Boulder, CO: Westview, 35-71. [Workshop Reprint R99-9]

Lake, David A., and Robert Powell, eds. 1999. *Strategic Choice and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chapters 1-3. [IU Bookstore]

Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42:427-60.

Week 6: February 14. Institutional Change and Conflict

This week's readings delve more deeply into the nature of institutions and why individuals act within institutional constraints. Levi emphasizes processes of quasi-compliance with institutional rules while Knight stresses that changes in institutional rules are inexorably intertwined with their distributional consequences. Firmin-Sellers provides a clear illustration of how distributional consequences shaped a particular instance of constitutional design. In the Lake and Powell volume, Rogowski surveys many connections between domestic institutional and international policies, and Gourevitch focuses on a crucial "governance problem" (if institutions have important consequences, then they will be the subject of political contention).

Levi, Margaret. 1990. "A Logic of Institutional Change." In *The Limits of Rationality*, ed. Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi, 402-18. University of Chicago Press, chapter 12.

Knight, Jack. 1992. *Institutions and Social Conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press, chapters 3 and 5.

Firmin-Sellers, Kathryn. 1999. "The Concentration of Authority: Constitutional Creation in the Gold Coast, 1950." In *Polycentric Governance and Development*, ed. Michael McGinnis, 186-208. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, chapter 9. [IU Bookstore]

Lake, David A., and Robert Powell, eds. 1999. *Strategic Choice and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chapters 4-5. [IU Bookstore]

Week 7: February 21. Resource Management and Conflict Issues: From Local to Global Scales

In this week, we begin to explicitly address the many problems of crossing levels of aggregation. Young draws out important similarities and differences between the management of small-scale common-pool resources and environmental regimes implemented at the global level. Clark Gibson, Elinor Ostrom, and T.K. Ahn provide a more general overview of scaling issues, and the *Science* article by Elinor Ostrom and several colleagues summarizes important relationships between local and global commons. The final two readings consider how conflict processes might also cross scales. Homer-Dixon's influential article surveys the conditions under which local resource conflict can escalate to broader political disputes. The link between resource issues and political conflict is by no means automatic, but in some cases this link can be quite devastating, as shown in Brander and Taylor's cautionary tale about Easter Island. In other circumstances, communities prove capable of managing all kinds of conflicts.

Young, Oran R. 1995. "The Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relationships." In *Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Elinor Ostrom, 27-45. Sage Publications, chapter 2.

Gibson, Clark, Elinor Ostrom, and Toh-Kyeong Ahn. 2000. "The Concept of Scale and the Human Dimensions of Global Change: A Survey." *Ecological Economics* 32:217-39.

Ostrom, Elinor, Joanna Burger, Christopher Field, Richard Norgaard, and David Policansky. 1999. "Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges." *Science* 284 (April 9): 278-82.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 1994. "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases." *International Security* 19(1): 5-40.

Brander, James A., and M. Scott Taylor. 1998. "The Simple Economics of Easter Island: A Ricardo-Malthus Model of Renewable Resource Use." *American Economic Review* 88(1) (March): 119-38.

Week 8: February 28. Conflict: Alternative Conceptualizations and Diverse Institutional Forms

In this week, we introduce several different ways of looking at conflict as a general phenomenon. Mary Parker Follett illustrates how some forms of conflict can be put to constructive use, but conflict can also prove to be very destructive. Boulding, Hirshleifer, and Olson have each struggled to apply the analytical tools of economic theory to different aspects of conflict; each provides important clues in this still uncompleted task. The anthropologist Gluckman provides a classic illustration of how patterns of conflict between groups can provide the foundation for social order; we will have occasion to examine related systems in subsequent readings. Finally, the Fearon and Laitin article uses the tools of modern game theory to specify the conditions under which such conflict-based systems of order might persist.

Follett, Mary Parker. 1940. "Constructive Conflict." In *Dynamic Administration*, ed. H. C. Metcalf and L. Urwick, 30-49. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.

Boulding, Kenneth. 1963. "Toward a Pure Theory of Threat Systems." *American Economic Review* 53 (May): 424-34.

Hirshleifer, Jack. 1994. "The Dark Side of the Force." *Economic Inquiry* 32:1-10.

Olson, Mancur. 2000. "The Logic of Power." In *Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships*, 1-24. Basic Books.

Gluckman, Max. 1956. "The Peace in the Feud." In *Custom and Conflict in Africa*, 1-26. Blackwell.

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 1996. "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation." *American Political Science Review* 90:715-35.

Week 9: March 7. Efforts to Disentangle Multiple Motivations for Conflict

Not all participants in violent conflicts need to share the same motivation. Contributors to the Berdal and Malone volume stress the contrast between a revolutionary's legitimate pursuit of redress for political grievances and the more selfish concerns exhibited by warlords. Collier's chapter is the centerpiece for this collection, but all the assigned chapters provide important clues towards a fuller understanding of the sheer complexity of contemporary conflicts. Those students most interested in the state of the art in the conflict literature are encouraged to read the Fearon-Laitin paper (certain to be published in a major journal), which is an impressive blend of theoretical and empirical research.

Berdal, Mats, and David M. Malone, eds. 2000. *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*. Lynne Rienner, chapters 1-7, pp. 1-153. [IU Bookstore]

Supplemental: Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 1999. "Weak States, Rough Terrain, and Large-Scale Ethnic Violence Since 1945." Paper presented at the APSA meeting.

Spring Break

Week 10: March 21. Designing Institutions to Resolve Conflicts Peacefully

Intense conflicts can arise in diverse manners. Posen demonstrates how conflicts can arise even if neither side seriously intends to inflict harm on the other, via the process known in the IR literature as the "security dilemma." De Figueiredo and Weingast model a process in which ethnic conflict is driven by desperate efforts by a leader to stay in power and by individual citizens to stay alive. Rothchild and Lake use credible commitments and related concepts of institutional analysis to point a way towards effective resolution of conflict. Russett's classic statement of alternative explanations of the "democratic peace" shows operation of similar processes at the level of international interactions. In short, liberal democratic states tend not to fight wars with each other because they have other ways of addressing their own security dilemmas.

Posen, Barry R. 1993. "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict." In *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, ed. Michael E. Brown, 103-24. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, chapter 6.

de Figueiredo, Rui J. P., Jr., and Barry R. Weingast. 1999. "The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict." In *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention*, ed. Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, 261-302. New York: Columbia University Press.

Rothchild, Donald S., and David A. Lake. 1998. "Containing Fear: The Management of Transnational Ethnic Conflict." In *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*, ed. David A. Lake and Donald S. Rothchild, 203-26. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, chapter 9.

Russett, Bruce. 1993. "Why Democratic Peace?" In *Grasping the Democratic Peace*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, chapter 3.

Week 11: March 28. A Deeper Look at American Democracy

The IR literature has only recently rediscovered the importance of democratic values and institutions, and the classic work on democracy remains that of Tocqueville. This week we examine the first part of a volume that has inspired much of the work conducted by Workshop scholars. Note especially the way the basic categories of the IAD framework can be related to Tocqueville's comparative evaluation of the factors most responsible for the success of democracy in America. Also, pay attention to Tocqueville's discussion of the three races in North America, for his analysis shows how this democratic order was based, at least in part, on conflict towards other groups denied a chance to participate in this democracy.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1988. *Democracy in America*, Volume I. HarperCollins. [IU Bookstore]

Week 12: April 4. Dilemmas of Sustaining Democratic Governance

In his second volume, Tocqueville expresses deep concerns about the long-term viability of democracy, especially in the American context. Vincent Ostrom applies these insights to the contemporary scene, and McGinnis and Ostrom investigate whether Tocqueville's concerns imply a reconsideration of the triumphant tone of the democratic peace argument.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1988. *Democracy in America*, Volume II. HarperCollins. [IU Bookstore]

Ostrom, Vincent. 1999. "Problems of Cognition as a Challenge to Policy Analysts and Democratic Societies." In *Polycentric Governance and Development*, ed. Michael McGinnis, 394-415. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, chapter 17. [IU Bookstore]

McGinnis, Michael, and Vincent Ostrom. 1999. "Democratic Transformations: From the Struggle for Democracy to Self-Governance?" Paper prepared for WOW2.

Week 13: April 11. Varieties of Law as Institutions for Conflict Resolution

Tocqueville listed judicial institutions as one of the most important contributors to the success of American democracy. In this week, we begin a preliminary exploration of the nature of adjudication as a process of conflict resolution. In the first part of a long article, Landes and Posner examine the "nature of the good" provided by adjudicators, and conclude that this good need not always be provided by public authorities. Friedman discusses an historical example of the private enforcement of law (in Iceland). Galanter places public law in the context of indigenous forms of law, and we read several selections from Berman's classic depiction of the origins of the polycentric Western tradition of law.

Landes, William M., and Richard A. Posner. 1979. "Adjudication as a Private Good: Part I. The Market for Judicial Services." *Journal of Legal Studies* 8:234-59.

Friedman, David. 1979. "Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case." *Journal of Legal Studies* 8:399-415.

Galanter, Marc. 1981. "Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law." *Journal of Legal Pluralism* 19:1-47.

Berman, Harold J. 1983. *Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition*. Harvard University Press. "Preface" (pp. v-viii), "Introduction" (pp. 1-10, 33-45), "Mercantile Law" (Chapter 11, 333-56), "Urban Law" (Chapter 12, pp. 357-403), "Beyond Marx, Beyond Weber" (538-58).

Week 14: April 18. Varieties of International Law

Once we realize that today's system of international law evolved out of the same complex mixture of legal jurisdictions that Berman examines, it becomes difficult to dismiss it so cavalierly. There is much more to international law than the interactions of sovereign states. Benson draws a direct connection between Berman's analysis and contemporary experience with international arbitration. Nadelmann examines the ways in which moral principles can serve to mobilize regimes that prohibit certain types of previously acceptable practices; his analysis is particularly subtle in its blending of moral, market, and power considerations. Finally, the two Yarbroughs use basic principles of new institutional economics to explain a few recent changes in jurisdictional boundaries. In a polycentric system of law, such boundaries should be mutable, and they specify conditions under which such changes may occur.

Benson, Bruce L. 1989. "The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law." *Western Economic Journal* 55:644-61.

Nadelmann, Ethan A. 1990. "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society." *International Organization* 44:479-526.