POLITICAL SCIENCE Y396: UNDERGRADUATE SEMINAR

--Gen. Jack Ripper, Dr. Strangelove

In this course you will have an opportunity to try your hand at this "strategic thought." In particular, we will investigate the basic logic of nuclear deterrence in some detail and compare this theory with the actual behavior of the superpowers as well as using these concepts to evaluate possible future arrangements.

As befits the multidisciplinary nature of the field of "strategic studies," we will read books written by an historian, two journalists, a retired policy maker, and an economist, and a few articles written by political scientists. In particular, we will study in some detail a classic book that uses mathematical models of games to reveal the underlying logic of nuclear deterrence. Some 30 years after publication this work continues to be frequently cited by experts in the field of security policy. Students are not expected to have any background at all in mathematics, but a bit of patience may, at times, be required. What would be useful is some previous familiarity with the basic structure of debates over nuclear weapons and arms control, obtained through previous courses in arms control, national security, or foreign policy. Some optional readings will be suggested for students lacking this background.

This course is unlike most undergraduate courses in that it is a seminar, which means that every student is expected to participate fully in class discussions. Attendance will be taken, and grades assigned for the quality of a student's contribution to our discussions.

This course is also designated a COAS Intensive Writing Section, which means that students will be expected to write four papers during the course of the semester. (Details about each paper are provided below.) For this reason, student papers will be graded on the basis of both content and proper grammar and style. (A very useful, and brief, reference for the latter areas is the paperback The Elements of Style, 3rd edition, by William Strunk, Jr., and E. B. White.) Each student must also be registered under a separate course number to obtain credit for the intensive writing requirement, and will receive a separate grade for the intensive writing part (graded satisfactory or not).

Three of the assigned papers will require familiarity only with the basic required readings, but the research paper will require students to locate additional readings and evaluate them in terms of the concepts and criteria covered in class. The topic for this research paper must be approved in advance by the instructor, and students are encouraged to begin work as soon as possible. Students will be expected to discuss their findings in class, although no formal presentations will be given. The ability of students to verbally convey their research to the rest of the class will be taken into account in figuring the student's grade.

• Grades will be calculated on the following basis: percentage
• Class participation: 25.0
• Each of the three short papers 12.5%, total: 37.5
• Research paper (including discussion of findings) 37.5

This is less complicated than it looks, since it amounts to 8 equally weighted parts, with each short paper counting for 1 part, the research paper for 3 parts, and class discussion for the remaining 2 parts. At present I have no plans for a final examination in this course, but I reserve the right to give a final exam if class discussions indicate insufficient comprehension of the assigned material. That exam would count for 2 parts towards a total of 10.

The following paperback books have been ordered for this course. Copies of some of these books may be available in the Reserve Room in the Main Library or in the Political Science Research Collection, 200 Woodburn. Additional readings will also be placed on reserve in one or both locations. (More details will be provided later.)

• Thomas B. Allen, War Games, 1987
• McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb
• in the First Fifty Years, 1988
• Gregg Herken, Counsels of War, expanded edition, 1987
• Jonathan Schell, The Abolition, 1984
• Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 1960

The following optional book has also been ordered. It is highly recommended for those who need a primer or a refresher on the basics of nuclear policy.

• Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma, 2nd ed., 1987

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE OF TOPICS AND ASSIGNMENTS

This schedule is subject to change, especially regarding specific reading assignments. However, advance notice will be given for any major changes.

Jan. 9 Get-Acquainted Session, no readings assigned

Jan. 16 Learning the Lingo: Deterrence As We Now Know It

• Readings: Review your notes or other sources on deterrence and defense policy
• (Optional: review or read Smoke, including Appendix)
• (You may also wish to begin reading Allen's book.)

Jan. 23 But, First, A Discouraging Word

• Readings: Allen, entire

SHORT PAPER 1 DUE

Jan. 30 Inventing a Theory of Strategy

Readings: Schelling, chapters 1-3, Appendix A

Feb. 6 The Relevance of Game Theory to Strategic Debates

• Readings: Schelling, chapters 4-6, Appendices B-C
• Snyder, Glenn H., "Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken Models in International Politics," International Studies Quarterly, (1971)15: 66-103 (on reserve)

Feb. 13 The Standard Scenarios of Nuclear War

• Readings: Schelling, chapters 7-10

Feb. 20 The Delicate Balance of Analysis?

• Readings: A research paper by the instructor to be distributed in class.

SHORT PAPER 2 DUE

Feb. 27 Initial Development and Use of Nuclear Weapons

• Readings: Bundy, chapters 1-4
• Herken, chapters 1-8

March 6 The 1950s: Super and the Gaps

• Readings: Bundy, chapters 5-7
• Herken, chapters 9-12

SPRING BREAK

March 20 The 1960s: From Cuba to SALT

• Readings: Bundy, chapters 8-9
• Herken, chapters 13-19

March 27 The 1970s: Detente and Its Demise

• Readings: Bundy, chapter 12, pp. 543-567 only
• Herken, chapters 20-26

April 3 Other States, Crises, Critics, Strategists

• Readings: Bundy, chapters 10-11

RESEARCH PAPER DUE

April 10 Recent, Current, and Future Procurement debates

April 17 Recent, Current, and Future Arms Control Issues

• Readings: Bundy, chapter 12, pp. 567-583, and chapter 13
• Other readings TBA

April 24 Which Future?

• Readings: Schell, entire

SHORT PAPER 4 DUE

TENTATIVE PAPER TOPICS

Further details will be provided later for each paper, but the tentative paper topics are discussed briefly below. Each requires you to present different types of arguments, but your presentation should always be clear, well-organized, and the logic of your argument carefully justified.

Each of the short papers should be 4-5 pages (typewritten, double-spaced).

SHORT PAPER 1 (Due Jan. 23) What do you consider the strongest and most convincing argument made by Allen? From what basic premises does he begin his justification? How does he demonstrate that this conclusion follows from these premises? That is, trace out the logic used by Allen to demonstrate this particular conclusion.

SHORT PAPER 2 (Due Feb. 20) Take two of the scenarios of nuclear war that U.S. deterrent policy is intended to avoid. Carefully explain the nature of tradeoffs between these two scenarios, showing how actions taken to lessen one of these problems necessarily makes the other problem more difficult to solve. That is, how does lessening the danger of one type of scenario occurring actually increase the probability of another? You are not expected to use specific game models, but you are expected to fully explain the precise logic behind your argument.

SHORT PAPER 3 (Due April 24) How would someone well-versed in strategic logic (like yourself) react to Schell's proposed abolition scheme? To what extent does his defense of his proposal take account of the concerns of strategic analysts? How far would a Schelling be willing to agree with Schell?

RESEARCH PAPER (Due April 3) For this research paper you should examine one of the following general topics in a paper of some 10-15 pages. Examples of specific topics are also listed; further details will be provided later.

• -Analyze the process of domestic debate over a recent or ongoing arms control negotiation. Do the terms of this debate correspond to the theoretical arguments we covered in class? What other factors seem to be involved?
  • Comprehensive Test Ban, Chemical weapons, INF, START, CFE, MBFR
• -Analyze a major procurement decision that happened well after Schelling's work was published. In what ways was this debate shaped by the logic of interlocking scenarios or other aspects of his theoretical perspective?
  • MX, Midgetman, Trident II (D-5), B-1, B-2 (Stealth), SDI,
  • Lance modernization, SLCMs
• -Analyze the major works of a significant strategic analyst other than Schelling. How did his approach differ from that of Schelling, and how was it similar? Be prepared to speculate as to what positions these theorists would take on future possibilities, including events after their death.
  • Nitze, Brodie, Kahn, Wohlstetter, Teller, McNamara, Kissinger
• -Compare other historical accounts of the development of nuclear strategy or deterrence crises to the analyses of Herken or Bundy. How would you explain their different interpretations?
  • Freedman, Gray, David Rosenberg, A. George, Lebow, Russett
• -Review the major works of important academic critics of the enterprise of strategic studies. How does their approach to analysis of these issues differ from the work of Schelling, Bundy, and Allen. Why do these differences exist?
  • Jervis, Bracken, H. Bull, A. Rapoport, P. Green, J.D. Singer, Kull
• -Evaluate the mathematical models of deterrence developed by some researcher or researchers other than Schelling. Compare the structure and implications of these models with that of Schelling. (Not for the faint of heart!)
  • Brito-Intriligator, O'Neill, Zagare, Brams-Kilgour, Saperstein

All paper topics must be approved by the instructor in advance. I will help you get started by pointing out the obvious major works for each topic and clarifying my expectations, but after that you are on your own. All students should begin consideration of possible paper topics as early in the semester as possible, in order to allow time to recall needed materials, etc. Also, to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort some students may not be able to write on their first choice. So get your requests in early!

Topics for research paper, Pol. Sci. Y396, Prof. McGinnis, Spring 1990

Here are some possible paper topics, with the basic reading you would need to do for each. (For recent arms control and procurement issues you will have to rely on articles and news reports.) For each topic you may have to find a few other relevant readings, but this assignment should not require a massive amount of research. The point is to analyze a topic in terms of the theoretical concepts covered in class, and to answer the relevant questions listed in the syllabus. You must decide on a topic as soon as possible. Some other topics may be acceptable, but must be approved by me in advance. Sign up sheets will be made available in class on March 6, but you are encouraged to see me before that time. I reserve the right to assign topics to those expressing no preference and to allocate topics so as to avoid duplication.