

Narratives of Strategic Interaction Involving Religious Organizations:

Proselytism, Humanitarian Aid, and International Conflict*

Michael D. McGinnis

Department of Political Science
Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana 47405

This version prepared February 25, 2007; posted at <http://php.indiana.edu/~mcginnis/portland3.pdf>

Please do not quote without permission.

Comments welcomed – mcginnis@indiana.edu

Author's Note: This paper was prepared for presentation at the 48th Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, Chicago, Illinois, Feb. 28-March 3, 2007. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of Religion, Economics, and Culture (ASREC) and the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Portland, Oregon, October 19-21, 2006 and the 2006 North American Meeting of the Peace Science Society (International), Columbus, Ohio, November 10-12, 2006. Much of the research for this paper was completed while I was on sabbatical leave at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame. I would like to thank my colleagues there and at the Indiana University Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis for their insightful comments on earlier drafts. Naturally, none of these individuals or organizations is responsible for the contents of this paper.

Abstract

Many faith-based organizations (FBOs) engage in global or transnational outreach. The delivery of humanitarian aid has long been a priority of FBOs, including some that are equally concerned with attracting new converts to their own faith. Newly aggressive forms of proselytism, especially by evangelical Christian groups, continue to generate political controversies in Russia, China, India, Indonesia, and throughout the Islamic world, especially now that the U.S. State Department publishes a yearly report on specific violations of religious human rights by all governments (except the U.S., of course!).

This paper develops a generic game model to articulate the common logical structure underlying sequences of strategic interaction between FBOs and governments at home and abroad. Particular characteristics of FBOs and these governments are identified that distinguish between conditions that generate equilibrium outcomes of non-interference with or attempted suppression of FBO activities, whether composed solely of aid operations or combined with proselytism, as well as international sanctions against governments that prohibit proselytism by foreign FBOs. To motivate this analysis and to illustrate its implications, recent examples of different configurations of interest and strategic calculation in faith-based diplomatic incidents are discussed.

Narratives of Strategic Interaction Involving Religious Organizations

The ongoing efforts of Christian missionaries to spread their faith to all corners of the world occasionally generate diplomatic disputes between the United States and public officials from the countries in which these operations are taking place. Some tensions directly result from host government efforts to restrict the activities of American missionaries or other faith-based organizations (FBOs); others emerge more indirectly through missionary ties to programs of humanitarian aid or development assistance managed by international faith-based service organizations. In this paper I lay out a theoretical framework that portrays government-FBO relations as a game of strategic interaction.

When proselytism and humanitarian assistance are combined, this connection is always controversial and sometimes covert. Although they may seem to be distinct activities, each partakes of a similar strategic logic: both are undertaken by faith-based organizations (FBOs) for their own purposes, both can generate external effects on governments and other political actors, and both elicit government efforts at manipulation that can, in some instances, escalate into diplomatic tensions or international conflict. To what extent can faith-based diplomatic incidents be said to originate in strategically sophisticated behavior on the part of FBOs? This paper begins to specify an extensive-form game model of strategic interactions among FBOs involved in proselytism and/or humanitarian aid, their state sponsors (typically the USA), and governments in areas in which these activities take place.

The first section introduces four recent instances of “faith-based diplomatic incidents” that were triggered by the activities of Christian missionaries and/or aid workers. Section 2 locates this paper within a broader research agenda on strategic interactions between the agents of religious and political organizations, with particular reference to international conflict. The third section begins the contextualization of the examples discussed earlier by surveying the wide array of potential spillover effects into the political realm generated by the self-motivated activities of faith-based organizations, along with potential government responses to these external effects, both those considered by the United States and more explicitly discriminatory or coercive options that other governments might implement. In addition, faith-based organizations responses to political efforts to manipulate their incentives are also considered. A generic game model that encompasses all these forms of interaction is defined in Section 4 and its equilibrium

conditions derived in Section 5. Section 6 offers suggestions about which next steps seem likely to prove most fruitful in the further elaboration of this research program.

1. Examples of Faith-Based Diplomatic Incidents

Many examples of diplomatic incidents triggered by the intimate connections between humanitarian aid and proselytism could be used to motivate this analysis. Four of the most noteworthy cases from recent years are:

1. In August 2001 the Taliban (then in power in pre-9/11 Afghanistan) arrested and convicted two Texas women, Dayna Curry and Heather Mercer, along with some other aid workers, for illegally engaging in proselytizing activities (Caldwell 2001). These members of the independent Antioch Community Church in Waco had originally gone to Afghanistan under the auspices of the German aid organization Shelter Now, but they also distributed some Christian books and videos. The rescue of these women in November by Northern Alliance forces received high-profile coverage in the U.S. media, and these aid workers/missionaries were deemed worthy of a personal meeting with President Bush in the White House.¹
2. In April 2003, as the U.S. military prepared to occupy Baghdad, Franklin Graham's Samaritan's Purse and other U.S.-based aid groups admitted that they hoped to contribute to the reconstruction process by converting locals to Christianity, which they felt would make Iraqis more amenable to democratic governance (Blumenthal 2003, Lampman 2003, O'Keefe 2003a). This hope was quickly disavowed by Bush administration officials, and the programs in question discontinued. Still, the damage was done, by reinforcing Muslim suspicions that a pro-Christian agenda inspires U.S. policy in the Middle East (Loconte 2003, O'Keefe 2003b, Rogers 2003, Waldman 2003).
3. After the December 2004 tsunami, Indonesian officials protested that some aid organizations were including Bibles in aid packages and intimated that some groups

¹ See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/images/20011126-1.html>.

caring for orphans sought to convert their charges to Christianity (Casey 2005, Rohde 2005). World Help was the aid organization charged with engaging in this nefarious plot, although they denied it was any different from previous programs and even compared themselves to the actions of Mother Teresa (Casey 2005, Cooperman 2005). In any event, this particular program was discontinued or even denied (Sipress 2005). In a nice piece of ironic justice, some Islamic aid organizations soon began distributing copies of the Qu'ran with their aid packages (Casey 2005).

4. In April 2006 Afghan officials charged with a capital offense Abdul Rahman, an Afghan citizen who returned to the country long after he had converted to Christianity. After subtle pressure from the U.S. government, Rahman was declared mentally unfit to stand trial and allowed to leave the country. This case is of particular interest in the current context because Rahman had converted “while working as a medical aid worker for an international Christian group helping Afghan refugees in the Pakistani city of Peshawar” (Cooney 2006). In effect, then, this case originated in events prior to the Curry-Mercer case discussed above, during a time when the U.S. was actively supporting opposition forces fighting the Soviet-dominated regime then in power in Afghanistan, especially including refugees then in Pakistan.

Many more such cases are reported on a regular basis in *Christianity Today* and other news outlets that target evangelicals and other Christian groups, but these four events are unusual in the extent of coverage they received from mainstream media. They differ along significant dimensions, particularly the nature of their relationship to official U.S. policy at the time.

The Curry-Mercer case brought a human face to the then-emerging confrontation between the U.S. and the Taliban. The Iraqi case conveys the strong impression that at least some elements of the U.S. government might be pursuing a close working relationship with evangelical Christian groups.² Once it became publicized, however, it damaged U.S. efforts to win friends in the Islamic world. The tsunami case has a much more tenuous link to official U.S. policy, and yet the bad feelings it generated resonated with deeply held suspicions of the increased involvement of Christian missionaries in all parts of the Islamic world (Innovative Minds 2005). Finally, the Rahman case exposed the Afghan regime as caught between its

² On this relationship in general see Ahmed 2005, Blumenthal 2003, Green 2001, Mead 2006,

American patron and the policy preferences of its own people. The Rahman case also demonstrates that long time delays may intervene between an act of humanitarian-related proselytism and the resulting diplomatic crisis. Although I have been unable to determine which aid organization Rahman had worked for near the end of the ill-starred Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, many of these organizations combine service delivery with efforts to expose aid workers and recipients to Christian messages.

None of these events proved critical in determining ultimate policy outcomes. Still, they are symptomatic of an under-recognized source of potential tension in international relations. In this paper I step back from these controversies to examine a broader strategic logic that is likely to generate more such tensions in the future, especially given the currently high salience attached to inter-religious tension in today's world.

Globally, evangelical and Pentecostal variants of Christianity grow, often despite resistance from local governments and cultural elites. Ultimately, most faith-based diplomatic incidents originate in the unceasing efforts of some Christian groups to spread their message throughout the world.³ Although their motives may be exclusively religious in nature, the consequences of their actions can have dramatic political effects, either immediately or after long delays. Other faith-based organizations, from a broader array of religious traditions, engage in far-flung operations to provide emergency humanitarian relief to people suffering from natural disasters or political violence.⁴ Here, again, the primary impetus is religious, with more directly obvious consequences in the political realm. In a similar fashion, other faith-based organizations engage in programs to further an agenda of peace, social justice, and sustainable development.⁵

A complicated array of religious organizations and secular human rights groups combined to exert pressure on the U.S. Congress to pass the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) in 1998 (Hertzke 2004). This act established two entities (an independent commission and an office in the State Department) charged with reporting on violations of religious freedom committed by all governments in the world (except, of course, the USA itself!). Each year's State

³ The dramatic growth and transformation of Christianity into a truly global religion is documented in Freston 2001, Gifford 1993, 1998, 2004, Jenkins 2003, 2004, 2006, Pierce 2003, Robert 1994, 2000, 2002, Sookhdeo 2005, Witte 2000, Witte and Bourdeaux 1999.

⁴ For analyses of FBOs in international humanitarian relief and development assistance, see Alkire 2001, Anderson 1999, Belshaw et al. 2001, Berer 2003, Dicklitch and Rice 2004, Hansen and Twaddle 2002, Hearn 2002, Kniss and Campbell 1997, Lindenberg and Bryant 2001, Manji and O'Coill 2002, Marshall 2001, 2005, McCleary 2004, Nichols 1988, Thomas 2004.

⁵ For analyses of faith-based organizations involved in peacemaking and peacebuilding activities, see Appleby 2000, Cox and Philpott 2003, Helmick and Petersen 2001, Johnston 2003, Johnston and Sampson 1994, Pierson 2001, Schirch 2005, Smock 2002, Tutu 1999, USIP 2001.

Department report generates understandably negative reactions,⁶ especially from “countries of particular concern” singled out for their failings in this area of human rights protection. Each report runs to hundreds of pages, giving plenty of opportunity for hurt feelings. On the other hand, given the many sources of potential tension between the U.S. and other governments, accusations included in these particular reports rarely made the headlines of mainstream media. Nonetheless, human rights activists can take some comfort in the fact that violations are being regularly documented in this way.⁷ Earlier proposals had included the stipulation that violations would automatically trigger the imposition of economic sanctions, but that proved too controversial. Still, the publicity generated by these official reports promises to maintain the public profile of these issues, which are in any event regularly publicized by media outlets within the evangelical Christian community.

2. Does Strategy Matter?

In this paper I step back from these examples to examine the overall logic of the strategic interactions between the agents of religious and political organizations. This paper lays out an initial model demonstrating that each of these cases manifests, in distinct ways, the same underlying strategic logic operating through common patterns of preferences and outcome expectations.

My model locates “faith-based diplomatic incidents” within a broader context of international politics and interest group (or advocacy coalition) mobilizations.⁸ My research question focuses on the extent to which the tools of game theory can be used to untangle the outcomes likely to be observed in different sets of circumstances. My initial suspicion is that strategic calculations are involved at every step along the way. By strategic calculations I mean that actors deciding upon a course of action explicitly take into account the likely responses of

⁶ For initial analyses of controversies associated with IRFA and other reports concerning religious freedom in Russia, China, India, and Islamic countries see Berman 1998 and Witte and Bourdeaux 1999, Potter 2003, Cozad 2005, and Fore 2002, respectively. For more general analyses of these issues, see Danchin 2002-03, Gunn 2000, Hertzke 2004, Richardson 2004, Smolin 2000-01.

⁷ For examination of the debate within the human rights community concerning the relative importance of religious human rights, see Durham 2001, Grim 2005, Grim and Finke 2006, Gunn 2000, Hackett 2003, Hertzke 2004, Lauren 2003, Lerner 1998, Marthoz and Saunders 2005, Nurser 2005, Richardson 2004.

⁸ For overviews of these related research literatures, see Mueller 1997, 2003; Shepsle and Bonchek 1997; Sabatier 1999, Scharpf 1997.

other actors, and the ways in which their own choices are likely to shape the responses of other actors and thereby determine the ultimate outcome. Game models are specifically designed to elucidate the conditions under which different outcomes emerge from such a process of strategic interdependence, in which outcomes that are differentially valued by participants are determined by the joint combination of their actions (Schelling 1960).

This model is part of my ongoing effort to encompass major patterns of religious-political interactions within a single, coherent analytical framework (McGinnis 2004, 2005, 2006a,b). Fundamental to my work is my presumption that faith-based organizations, for their own reasons, engage in activities that generate positive or negative external effects on specific political organizations or on society more generally. Political agents respond by seeking to manipulate the incentives of FBO agents so as to enhance positive effects and discourage continued generation of negative externalities. As will be shown below, however, their efforts to manipulate FBO agent incentives are hampered by fundamental aspects of FBOs as organizations and the nature of their strategic interactions with political organizations.⁹

I draw upon an extensive body of research applying rational choice theory to the study of religious belief, behavior, and organization.¹⁰ Much of this research focuses on competitive interactions among different religious organizations. Stark and Finke (2000) provide a useful compilation of hypotheses from this literature, all derived from a common logical structure. Briefly, the expectation is that all available niches (as defined by different constellations of consumer tastes for religious products) will be occupied by appropriate religious organizations,¹¹ as long as there are no externally imposed restrictions on the formation and promulgation of new faiths. Researchers in this tradition of the rational choice analysis of religious markets have examined the consequences of a competitive marketplace in religion, as well as other macro-level patterns in relations between political and religious systems at the national level. My contribution lies in extension of this tradition of research to patterns of micro-level strategic interactions between diverse religious organizations and political entities.¹²

⁹ For an insightful analysis of the inherent difficulties political leaders face when manipulating the incentives of religious leaders, see Volume Two, Book V, Chapter 1, Article 3 of Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*.

¹⁰ For reviews of the rational choice literature as it applies to the study of religion, see Iannaccone 1998; Beckford 2000; Demereth et al. 1998; Legee 2003. Stark and Finke 2000 and Gill 2005 are especially useful syntheses of this literature.

¹¹ See Figure 5.2 in Chaves (2004: 147) for a fascinating graphic portrayal of the range of worship elements characterizing major Christian denominations in the U.S. context.

¹² For macro-level analyses, see especially Gill 2005, Grim and Finke 2006, Jalen and Wilcox 2002, and Stark and Finke 2000. Ekelund et al. (1996) focus on the medieval Catholic Church as an organization, but its unique status as a transnational governance institution makes their analysis difficult to generalize to other patterns of inter-organizational relations. For other approaches to the organization of religious organizations, see footnote 15 below.

I discuss more of the analytical preliminaries in my previous papers, especially McGinnis (2006a). Here it suffices to say that an organization is religious or faith-based when its leaders (or more technically those acting as agents of their constituent principals) have been socialized into the expectation that they should pursue specifically religious goals that can not be directly reduced to political power, economic wealth, or social status in this world. Whether or not they as individuals derive utility from these non-tangible goals, they realize that their followers expect certain behavior from them, and their actions must comport, to some degree, with these expectations if they want remain in that role.¹³ The specific content of this second dimension of utility need not be defined for its effects to be demonstrated.

Religion has its own dynamic logic, in the sense that faith-based organizations grow and decline, split and intermingle according to their own underlying logics. The operations of faith-based organizations need not have any direct impact on politics or on society as a whole. However, certain kinds of their efforts tend to have political effects that rarely proceed unnoticed by the powers that be.

Two sets of motivations are particularly influential within most religious movements, albeit with different emphases and salience for different movements at different times and locations. In the first place, many religious faiths seek to grow, to convince others to join with them. Second, individuals inspired by religious faith are often especially attuned to the needs of the most disadvantaged members of their society, even those living halfway across the world. This second motivation inspires an endless stream of activities directed at providing assistance to the poor as well as, in some circumstances, political activism directed towards improving their rights or helping end the violence or other conditions that cause these victims so much pain and suffering. In many circumstances, these two motivations complement each other, since people who are down on their luck are often good candidates for conversion. However, proselytizing activities are broader in scope, and are not limited only to the recipients of faith-based social outreach or political mobilization campaigns.

Prominent among positive externalities are benefits that disadvantaged groups receive from the assistance offered them by disinterested religious actors. Charities and other programs run by faith organizations provide a certain level of public services, for their own reasons and without any encouragement or compensation by political agents. Recipients of faith-based

¹³ In this formulation I attempt to integrate the standard mode of rational choice with the “logic of appropriateness” as laid out by March and Ohlsen (1984, 1989). In addition, this second dimension of utility is inspired by the delta parameter used by Crawford and Ostrom (1995) to express the intrinsic costs and benefits associated with complying with or violating valued norms or rules.

assistance benefit from the existence of these programs. Society as a whole may also be said to benefit, in the sense that more people can be confident that help will be available for them should they need it at some future date. Providing such assurance is one of the public goods that government officials are expected to provide. For the most part, then, faith-based service outreach conveys positive externalities both to actual and potential recipients and to public officials. If state officials are not inclined to help certain disadvantaged groups, however, they may remain indifferent or even hostile to FBO programs of assistance. Typically, however, the reaction is positive. On the donor side, tax breaks are routinely provided to charitable activities, as a means to encourage their activities. In addition, public officials (at the local, state/provincial, or national levels) may involve themselves in direct partnerships with faith-based service organizations, in hopes of taking advantage of their complementary strengths.

When faith-based organizations move beyond the delivery of immediate assistance to engage the poor and disadvantaged in political activism on their own behalf, however, reaction from public officials is likely to be less positive. On the other hand, some political entrepreneurs may see these activists as potential allies in their own efforts to achieve power or to implement reforms.

Negative externalities are most clearly expressed in the aggressive proselytism of believers eager to share their understanding of the spiritual world with non-believers or with believers of rival traditions. As usual, negative externalities generate especially sensitive political controversies. The very nature of conversion is to remove an individual (or even an entire community) from one social context or belief system and insert them into another. Those left behind will feel aggrieved, as exemplified in the intensely negative reaction of family members when one of their own joins a fringe cult. If, in addition, the group from which the convert was removed is well-connected to political or religious authorities, then agents of their respective organizations are likely to take active measures to discourage this form of proselytism.

Proselytism-driven politics can take many different forms, depending on the configuration of relations among proselytizers, their targeted group, other religious organizations, and political authorities in both home and target countries. A comparable range of diverse responses is elicited by those faith-based organizations engaged in the delivery of humanitarian relief or development aid as well as those mobilizing on the behalf of marginalized or victimized peoples. Ironically, none of these activities may have been initially inspired by any explicitly political agenda. The key point is to realize that efforts directed solely at goals defined

within a faith tradition may have external effects on political processes and actors that result in policy partnerships, partisan struggles, or international confrontations.

Although patterns of policy partnership, partisanship, and proselytism are analytically separable, in practice one form can morph into another. The experience of international humanitarian aid organizations (HAOs), many of which are related to particular religious traditions, is instructive. Although humanitarians may see themselves as apolitical, they are dealing with a situation in which some political forces benefit from violence or continued unrest. Humanitarians have lately become acutely aware of this dilemma, as concerns mount that their efforts to help refugees and other victims of war or civil unrest can, in many circumstances, contribute towards the continued operation of the conflict system.¹⁴

3. The Broader Context for Faith-Based Diplomatic Incidents

As noted above, the starting point of my analysis is the realization that actions of a diverse array of faith-based organizations can generate externalities that affect segments of the political world, either for ill or for good. In response, public officials have an opportunity to try to encourage religious leaders and organizations to increase those activities seen to generate positive externalities and to discourage actions that generate negative ones. Of course, their evaluation of these externalities need not correspond in any systematic fashion to the effects originally intended by leaders or members of the relevant faith-based organizations.

In sum, each of the types of FBO behavior discussed above can have positive consequences for some political actors as well having a negative impact on the interests of other political actors. These external effects are precisely what inspires political leaders to try to channel the behavior of faith-based organizations, with each political leader trying to encourage behavior that has positive benefits and discourage behavior with more negative effects.

Although it may not be widely recognized as such, a remarkably wide range of policy responses (whether legal, regulatory, symbolic, financial, or partisan in form) are available to political leaders seeking to manipulate the incentives of religious leaders and the members of faith-based organizations (see Fox 2006). For the purposes of this analysis, we simplify matters by dividing this range of potential political responses into those that have either an enhancing or suppressive effect on FBO operations. In addition, we highlight the different range of options

¹⁴ For controversies within the humanitarian aid community about appropriate priorities and programs, see Anderson 1999, Fowler 1999, Lindenberg and Bryant 2001.

available to different types of regimes, and in particular between the United States, acting as a major donor for humanitarian aid and other public service programs implemented by some faith-based organizations, and those available to governments in charge where these operations are implemented.

In the first place, the U.S. government may encourage or discourage certain organizations from engaging in particular practices. U.S. public officials are limited in how blatantly they can manipulate religious organizations, because of the widespread perception of a wall of separation between church and state. However, many organizational ties cross this “wall,” with respect to both domestic policy (Ammerman 2005, Chaves 2004, Wuthnow 2004), and international humanitarian and development aid (Nichols 1988, Kniss and Campbell 1997, McCleary 2004). U.S. officials are also restricted by norms against any infringement of religious freedom, which sharply restricts the range of policy options available for their use. Still, officials can determine what types of proselytizing activities are not appropriate for federally funded programs of international humanitarian aid or development assistance.

Secondly, public officials from those countries where the programs are implemented can themselves act to encourage or discourage these same programs. Many of these governments face considerably fewer constraints on the application of policy options, including coercive ones, to religious organizations. Indeed, some governments enjoy quite close relations with the representatives of particular religious traditions, and may naturally be expected to protect that relationship by limiting the actions of rival religious groups. Since the U.S. and other governments may have very differing interests in play, there are likely to be situations in which their policies act at cross-purposes, thus setting up the potential for diplomatic confrontations.

I realize that some readers may deem such an explicit statement of overt political manipulation of religion as inappropriate or even disturbing, but I argue that such manipulation is commonplace, and that policy analysts should come to appreciate the extent to which religious organizations have already been incorporated within governance structures operative in many places throughout the world. Briefly, tax breaks for charitable contributions and other financial incentives are typically relevant only for the behaviors that result in the delivery of social services (a matter of some controversy as illustrated by the Charitable Choice provisions of the 1996 welfare reform bill and Pres. Bush’s subsequent Faith-Based and Community Initiative.) Analysis has focused instead on the practical implications, if any, of channeling additional public monies through congregations, faith-based charities and related organizations. When it comes to

international humanitarian aid or development assistance, officials of governments on the receiving end may be especially eager to craft means to incentivize external donors to offer funds to their own local allies rather than to groups that are less supportive of the government in power.

Symbolic policy instruments prove more relevant to efforts to selectively reinforce some aspects of a religious tradition so as to strengthen civil religion. Controversies over the proper role of religious beliefs and values in public education fall under this category. Legal and regulatory policy instruments can be used to encourage or discourage proselytism, through such seemingly innocuous means as requiring all religious organizations to register all the way to more draconian measures such as assigning differential legal rights to members of different religious faiths. Finally, more explicitly political measures are used to reward coalition members for their support at election time, although in most instances such rewards fall short of actually turning power over to religious leaders. Still, theocracy is not unknown even in today's world. Not all of these options are likely to prove feasible in the specific context of the United States, and yet each has been utilized by one government or another.

A further complication is that the leaders of the faith-based organizations themselves can respond to these incentives in many different ways, and should be expected to react in ways that further their own interests or the interests of their organizations, as they interpret these interests. For our purposes, three forms of FBO responses are especially important to consider.

First, response may come in the form of revisions of the organization itself or even the establishment of separate organizational entities better positioned to take fuller advantage of financial incentives. This incentive may well be a critical foundation of the common distinction made between faith-centered organizations (such as congregations and other entities focused almost entirely on forms of worship) and faith-based service organizations engaged in the delivery of practical services. Transaction cost considerations are also relevant here, since it may make sense for members of different congregations to combine their efforts in practical service delivery, even in the absence of external rewards to doing so.¹⁵

In addition to forming new organizations in order to more effectively respond to government incentives to deliver aid programs, faith-based organizations can also pursue programs of mobilization or duplicity.

¹⁵ Contributors to Demerath et al. 1998 offer several alternative interpretations of organizational aspects of faith-based organizations. Other useful perspectives include Allen 1995, Cowan 2004, Ekelund et al. 1996, Lipford 1992, Mao and Zech 2002, K. Miller 2002, Smith and Sasin 2001, Sullins 2004.

The point of the mobilization option is to encourage the intervention of other political groups or actors, ones who do not share the same interest as the ones doing the manipulating in the first place. News media may be used to awaken political leaders or their constituent groups to the unfortunate conditions under which they are forced to operate. Faith-based and secular humanitarian aid organizations may publicize the human rights abuses perpetrated by officials who divert aid supplies or who even rely on external aid to provide for the basic needs of their own citizens whom they want to force out of especially attractive regions of their own country. Here the relative ability of faith-based organizations to mobilize support becomes a critical variable. Their capacity to do so can often be quite impressive, as in the campaigns for the protection of international religious human rights detailed in Hertzke (2004). In other cases, especially for minority religions with no connections to political patrons, efforts to mobilize external support may fail miserably. The case of the IFRA mobilization is misleading in its scope, for there are many more instances where the parties involved in a particular instance try to convince American officials to espouse their cause and to press the other governments involved to release or rescue individual missionaries or to loosen restrictions against their activities in that country. It is this more targeted form of mobilization that has the potential of moving particular disputes further along the escalatory path.

The final option, duplicity in the sense of creative law-breaking on the part of the faith-based organization whose behavior a government is trying to restrict, is less well-known. An FBO engaged in humanitarian assistance, for example, might try to bypass government restrictions by channeling aid through the rebel groups fighting the government, or to focus on supplying refugees camped in neighboring countries, and thus outside the control of their own government. FBOs facing unwanted restrictions on proselytism may find covert means of spreading the gospel, by presenting themselves as business leaders or aid workers. This strategy is known in the missionary literature as tentmaking or creative access to unevangelized peoples living in restricted access countries.¹⁶

It may be impossible to accurately gauge the extent of hidden proselytism, but my suspicion is that it is this strategic response that serves as the most likely source for potentially explosive diplomatic incidents. In any event, the reality of its occurrence helps locate specific crises in a broader context. Christian activists may have a point about the frequency of anti-

¹⁶ Tentmaking refers to the practice of the early Christian leader Paul in supporting himself by making and selling tents in the early stages of his ministry to peoples in different parts of the Roman Empire. Today's tentmakers may be engaged in a wide range of activities, including tourism or education. See Barnett 2005a,b, Pierce 2001, Pocock 2005. Bergner 2006 is an influential article that brings an insightful perspective to today's missionaries.

Christian persecution around the world (Shea 1997, Boyd-MacMillan 2006), and yet their own actions generate plenty of reasons for public officials to be wary of hidden proselytism. Even subtle forms of proselytism, such as the way in which Abdul Rahman was converted in Peshwar so many years ago, can have long-delayed and yet dramatic effects on global politics.

4. A Game Model of Proselytism and Humanitarianism

Figure 1 defines the game model used in the remainder of this paper. Three actors are involved, denoted F, G, and H.¹⁷ F represents a faith-based organization (FBO) engaged in some combination of proselytism and the delivery of humanitarian aid, development, or other public services. G denotes the regime in charge of the area where the FBO's potentially controversial activities are conducted. This government will be referred to as G or TG, for target government, which somehow seems a more appropriate choice than recipient government, since the officials often see themselves as being targeted by foreign organizations. Finally, H is used to denote the "hegemon," that is, the strong state acting to protect the FBOs and the individuals working for those FBOs. In some circumstances H might be better seen as the donor or the protector state, but using H immediately conveys the unequal power relation in place between the two governments playing these proselytism-aid games.¹⁸

The game begins when externalities are generated by a faith-based organization. Since these externalities have their origins in activities inherent in the operation of that FBO, there is no need to consider the option of it not generating externalities. Overall, we expect to see a range of such organizations, some primarily concerned with the delivery of humanitarian assistance or other public services. On the other hand, those missionary and other faith-based organizations seeking to spread that faith typically include some aspect of aid, education, or health care as part of their operations. For this reason, we do not need to consider purely proselytizing organizations and can focus instead on the contrast between pure aid organizations and dual-purpose organizations involved in both kinds of work, secular and religious.

Typically, the recipients of aid and/or the targets of proselytism will tend to see the former as representing positive externalities and the latter as negative. These inter-related externalities pose a choice for both governments. In Figure 1 the US hegemon is presumed to act first. Its decision to fund or not fund a specific FBO will be affected by the relative mix of proselytism and service delivery in their planned programs. Since the primary purpose of US aid

¹⁷ None of these organizations can be accurately described as a unitary rational actor, but for purposes of analysis each can be treated as such, at least as a first approximation. A few of the most pertinent complications entailed by their deviations from this idealized assumption are discussed below, with further complications deferred to subsequent research. For further discussion of my interpretation of the uses and limitations of this unitary rational actor assumption in related models, see McGinnis 1991, 2000b.

¹⁸ Although the US is here designated as the hegemonic protector of Christian missionary and aid organizations, a related model could be applied to the similarly complicated actions of Islamic aid organizations supported by the government of Saudi Arabia or other Islamic regimes. This complication is left for development in subsequent research.

is to support practical improvements in development or in the delivery of emergency humanitarian aid, any associated dabbling in proselytism poses potential costs. After all, a funding relationship necessarily implies a certain level of commitment and support for that FBO.

On the other hand, there may be cases in which proselytization is welcomed by the U.S. government, or at least by certain elements of a particular administration. However, the focus of the present analysis lies on cases in which humanitarianism might be combined with some forms of proselytism, under conditions of an explicit contractual relationship for service delivery. Even without government funds, if FBO operatives are US citizens, a certain degree of enmeshment is inevitable.

Just because the US government decides to award a contract only for the delivery of public services is no guarantee that the FBO will avoid all taints of proselytism in the implementation of a government sponsored program. Thus, the second strategic choice in Figure 1 is that of the faith-based organization, seeking to concentrate its efforts on aid or to implement some mixture of both secular and religious purposes. For purposes of this analysis, we presume that both G and H can distinguish dual-purpose organizations from those that are primarily service-oriented. This is not to say that in some circumstances missionary activities are intentionally hidden, as in the creative-access strategy discussed above. However, for purposes of this initial analysis we assume that any such duplicity is either rare or easily discernable by the governments involved.¹⁹

The two major branches of the game tree in Figure 1 differentiate between the effects of differing levels of resources available to the FBOs to implement their operations. With US funding a much higher level of aid could be delivered. However, it may also be the case that significant levels of government funding may allow a dual-purpose FBO to also more effectively realize its ambitions in terms of proselytization. More resources should enable more of both kinds of programs to be implemented. Even if the US or other official donors try to restrict their

¹⁹ One potential complication of this model would be to allow FBOs to hide their true nature from government observers. By applying for US funding, a hidden dual-purpose organization might duplicitously signal its intention to focus on secular aid, in order to attract the higher levels of resources it requires to carry out its missionary efforts. It is this complication that would require the inclusion of a choice by nature at the start of the game to select the type of the FBO, with that type remaining hidden from the other two players. One consequence of this uncertainty is that the TG could not be sure of the extent of the US commitment to all aspects of the program enacted by any single FBO. After all, the targets may be better positioned to observe the true nature of the programs that would be the donors. In subsequent versions of this model, this uncertainty will be incorporated via the assignment of explicit beliefs (probability assessments) concerning the likelihood with which the US will support an FBO or individual missionary/aid worker in a particular confrontation, and these beliefs will be updated based on the play of the game.

funding to secular aid projects, monetary resources are fungible and may be shunted to other ends.

The target government is the next to act in Figure 1. G faces four distinguishable situations, with pure aid or dual-purpose operations implemented at either high or low levels of magnitude. In general, any government's response to specific activities of faith-based organizations can take one of three generic forms: (a) support/encourage/reward, (b) allow/ignore, or (c) resist/discourage/punish/repress. For this analysis it proves useful to interpret G's choices differently depending on whether or not proselytism is part of the situation in play. For the case of pure aid operations, G is effectively realizing positive externalities from F's operations, whether or not they have been funded by H. In particular, officials from G can typically divert more of those resources to serve their own purposes, and thus to augment the extent of the benefits G receives from these programs.²⁰

When G faces a dual-purpose FBO, however, G experiences a mixture of positive (aid) and negative (proselytism) externalities. Here G has an interest to enhance the former and ameliorate the latter. In Figure 1 G chooses between accepting the current mix of positive and negative effects or acting to restrict or limit the negative effects of proselytism. Actions to be taken here range from imposing registration requirements to criminalizing proselytism and/or conversion and to the actual arrest and punishment of missionaries or their local converts.

The action starts, so to speak, when public authorities in the Target Government arrest or do other harm to an individual FBO operative or fail to protect them from violent acts committed by its own citizens or by expelling the FBO from the country entirely. At this point the USA re-enters the game. How will US leaders respond to these attacks on the security of its citizens and/or on the operation of programs it has chosen to fund, or even in circumstances when a U.S. citizen operating without official government sanction, has been arrested by local officials?²¹

It seems reasonable to presume that this US decision will be affected by the extent of its support as demonstrated in its previous decision to fund that program. At base, there is a minimal

²⁰ The tendency of governments and rebel forces to divert humanitarian aid to fund continued military operations, for example, has become a major concern in the humanitarian aid literature (Macrae and Zwi 1994; Anderson 1999; McGinnis 2000b, Lindenberg and Bryant 2001). For purposes of simplicity, I here assume that all target or recipient governments divert some proportion of foreign aid to serve their own purposes.

²¹ Technically, it may be necessary to interpose another choice node before the US responds to a particular act of TG repression, to designate whether or not mainstream news media organizations choose to pay attention to this event. As noted above, there is an active array of Christian media sources which routinely cover all instances of persecution against individual Christians or their organizations, but very few instances cover receive sufficient public attention to require an explicit US response. Incorporation of this media "choice" into this game model remains a question for subsequent investigation.

initial predisposition to protect American citizens abroad, but that inclination can be overcome in instances in which the individuals in question were involved in illegal activities or, especially, in actions that reflect poorly on US interests in the region. Should the US choose to espouse the cause of the persecuted individual or threatened organizations, a full-blown faith-based diplomatic incident shall have commenced. If, on the other hand, the US chooses to back down, then the extent of its reputation costs are likely to be higher for aid programs it had earlier chosen to fund and less for those dual-purpose FBOs that turned out to divert too much of their effort to proselytism.

In effect, a dual-purpose FBO that has received US funding can be said to be shirking its responsibility to implement with all due effort the aid programs that the donor wanted it to implement. This suggests an alternative model of principal-agent relations, in which the US donor acts as principal and the FBO as its agent. The US can exert *ex ante* control by carefully selecting which FBO programs it chooses to support. This control can be supplemented by *ex post* controls in the form of refusing to protect those components of a dual-purpose FBO's programs that the US did not originally intend to fund. However, this system of interaction cannot be reduced to a standard principal-agent problem because of the intervening effect of the targeted government, which acts to either divert the implementation of funded programs or to restrict the unfunded proselytizing remnant of the FBO operations in question. Thus, the more unusual game tree shown in Figure 1 seems most appropriate to this three-sided strategic situation.

This completes the game of this generic model of US and TG responses to FBO-generated externalities. At this point we must impose specific assumptions concerning the preference orderings of each actor for these outcomes. For the purposes of this paper it is not necessary to associate all outcomes with particular numerical representations of utility; instead a few general presumptions suffice for this preliminary analysis.

Before actor preference orderings can be assigned to the outcomes, we must specify the characteristics of each outcome. Given the considerations discussed above, outcomes differ with respect to five characteristics, as denoted in the Outcome Levels shown to the right of Figure 1.

- (x) The level of aid delivered to recipients, consistent with goals of the donor H
- (y) The diversion of aid by the target/recipient government for its own purposes
- (z) The number of conversions to the religion advocated by a dual-purpose FBO

- (w) Cost to the reputation of H should it decline to support a threatened F
- (t) Trade disruptions and other costs of sanctions or diplomatic incident

As shown in the utility functions defined in the box below the outcome levels, no one actor is concerned with all five of these outcome characteristics. For the Faith-Based Organization F, only the number of conversions and the level of aid delivered matter. The donor/hegemon government H is concerned primarily with the extent to which its own goals are enhanced by levels of aid F actually delivers to recipients, moderated by concerns about the potential costs entailed either by ignoring or challenging G's restrictions on F's religious freedom. Finally, the target/recipient government G seeks to maximize diversions of aid for its own purposes while minimizing the negative externalities implied by conversions, while at the same time taking into consideration potential costs of a diplomatic confrontation or even sanctions. As specified below, G's central authorities may or may not be concerned about the actual level of aid delivered to recipient groups, who may be engaged in efforts to overthrow that regime.

To simplify presentation, I use capital letters (A,C,D) to denote levels of aid delivered to recipients or diverted by G for other purposes, number of conversions, and level of reputation costs suffered by a non-sanctioning donor government, that are substantially higher, by some order of magnitude, than levels denoted by lower-case letters (a,c,d). Several other parameters are introduced below.

Among the relevant factors are these. The credibility of US threats or promises to protect FBOs operating abroad are affected by the extent to which that regime depends on the political support of constituents affiliated with that faith tradition and by its geopolitical interest in maintaining good relations with the target government. These two considerations will combine to determine that government's level of willingness to devote its political capital to the protection of proselytizers or faith-based operatives of different kinds. The target government's decisions are in turn affected by its sensitivity to foreign operations, which is going to be high for any autocratic regime or for any regime, autocratic or not, that relies on connections to a particular religious tradition or organization for its legitimacy. Furthermore, different TGs will exhibit differing levels of capacity to actually control access to its own population. Faith-based organizations will differ in the closeness of their ties to the home government and to the religious

traditions dominant in both countries, and in the relative emphasis that FBO places on proselytism as its primary mission.

Any extensive game model represents a particular narrative of strategic interaction among the players included in that model. In order to take advantage of the technical apparatus of game theory, it is essential to define that narrative precisely, and each specific decision or simplification can have direct or indirect consequences on the implications of that model. To simplify the presentation, I now move to a step-by-step account of the sequence of decisions represented in the game model shown in Figure 1, along with my justifications of the simplifications imposed at each step.

To reiterate, there are three actors involved: F, a faith-based organization based in the country of the hegemonic state H, with F's operations directed to citizens ruled by the target government G.

1. F is already engaged in aid operations (at level a), which may involve related aspects of proselytism, which results in c conversions. F receives benefits from both aspects of its operations, with the relative magnitude attached to the proselytism mission denoted by m ($0 < m < M$), where the maximum magnitude M may be many times larger than the base importance of aid delivery, which is set at one for purposes of comparison to m .
2. G diverts a proportion ($0 < v < 1$) of this aid for its own purposes. The proportion v can be interpreted as a manifestation of the level of corruption inherent in existing state structures, in that a certain amount of aid has to be diverted to cover the patronage needed to sustain the regime's base of support. In addition, G may receive some utility from the level of aid actually delivered to the recipients, depending on q ($-1 < q < 1$), which denotes the attitude of G towards this recipient group.
3. Meanwhile, the relevant hegemon (H, typically the U.S.) may also derive some utility from the level of aid delivered by F, with H's concerns parameterized by s ($-1 < q < 1$), denoting the salience of this recipient group to H's geo-strategic interests.
4. H chooses whether or not to augment F's aid operations by providing substantial funding, which effectively increases the level of aid from a to A , where $A \gg a$.
5. F chooses whether or not to divert some of this funding to support its proselytism operations, seeking a higher level of conversions, C , which is also much larger than the original level c of unaided conversions.
6. Because H's funding is specifically designed for purposes of improving the delivery of humanitarian and/or development aid, we can presume that aid levels are increased by a higher magnitude than are the number of conversions, that is, $A/a > C/c$.
7. G continues to divert the same proportion of aid (v) but now has the option of blocking F's proselytism operations, in hopes of reducing the number of successful conversions. G has the capacity to block a proportion b ($0 < b < 1$) of these conversions; b can be interpreted as a measure of G's effectiveness, or state capacity.
8. The extent to which G is interested in blocking conversions is determined by the closeness of its relationship to local religious elites and organizations. The relative magnitude (compared to its interest in diverting aid) of this consideration is denoted by p

- ($0 < p < 1$), interpreted as G's interest in protecting local religions from the conversion threat posed by this foreign F, which may or may not be funded by H.
9. If G does not engage in any efforts to block F's proselytism, then the game ends. However, if G does block proselytism, then agents of F will presumably complain to any potential supporter, specifically H.
 10. The extent to which H cares about the complaints of F is determined by the closeness of H's relationship to F, which is denoted by k , ($0 < k < 1$). If H refuses to take any reaction to counter G's blocking of F's missionary endeavors, then H suffers reputation costs R , which impart a decrease in utility of magnitude kR , where k denotes the relative magnitude of this consideration compared to other considerations. For simplicity, I presume that H suffers the same level of costs to its reputation whether or not it had been funding F's aid operations, since the government of any Great Power is supposed to protect its citizens abroad, even if they were not operating under the direction of public authorities.
 11. If H chooses to respond to G's suppression of F's activities, it implements a two-pronged strategy. First, it instigates a diplomatic incident by lodging a protest against G, as well as imposing general sanctions against trade with G. This incident imposes on G the costs of disrupted trade and diplomatic tensions, denoted by D or d , with $D > d$. Disruption costs are higher if F had been in the process of implementing aid programs funded by H, since these additional programs must also be shut down, over and above the disruption costs (d) implied by the suspension of other forms of diplomatic or economic exchange.
 12. These sanctions also impose comparable costs on H itself, depending on the nature of the existing relationship between H and G. In particular, H suffers the cost nD , where n ($-1 < n < 1$) denotes the overall tenor of geo-strategic relations between H and G. If H and G are friendly states, then $n > 0$ and for allies n is set close to 1. If H and G currently have poor relations, then $n < 0$ and n approaches the extreme value of -1 for cases of rivalry or outright antagonism. As a consequence, H may actually benefit (in utility terms) from imposing sanctions on a potential enemy.
 13. As part of this sanctions regime, H is presumed to stop all funding of F's aid operations, which as a consequence are reduced to zero. If F had previously diverted some of this funding to support its proselytism operations, then the effects of this missionary infrastructure are presumed to remain in effect, meaning that sanctions will not change the levels of conversion.
 14. Finally, even if H had not previously funded F's operations, then F's aid operations would also be shut down, along with all other financial or economic transactions. However, F's efforts to convert members of G's population may continue as before, at the low level that G proved unable to block, because of the infrastructure (local church partners, etc.) that had already been established, and because these missionary activities always operate outside of the standard procedures of diplomacy or international trade.

In summary, we have 4 upper-case and 10 lower-case parameters, some of which serve a dual purpose. They can be categorized as follows:

Outcome Levels (all positive values)

- A, a Level of aid operations undertaken by F, with or without H's funding ($A >> a$)
- C, c Number of conversions, with or without H's funding of aid operations ($C >> c$)
- D, d Cost to G of diplomatic tension and disrupted trade with H ($D > d$)

R Reputation costs imposed on H by F's supporters

Organizational Structure (all constrained to lie between 0 and 1)

G as a state:

v proportion of aid diverted, related to level of corruption in G

b G's capacity to effectively block foreign penetration from F

F as a faith-based organization

m Importance of missionary imperative

Closeness of relationship between actors (with absolute value less than 1)

q G's attitude toward the group receiving aid from F (may be positive or negative)

p G's desire to protect local religions from F's proselytism (between 0 and 1)

s H's attitude toward the group receiving aid from F (between 0 and 1)

n H's attitude toward G (may be positive or negative)

k H's attitude toward or closeness to F (between 0 and 1)

Relative magnitude of components in utility functions (as defined above)

m Importance of missionary imperative (for F)

q, p Importance of recipient group aid and protection of local religions (for G)

s, k, n Importance of recipient group, F's supporters, and G as ally/enemy (for H)

5. Equilibrium Conditions

Given these definitions of utility functions and the characteristics of each outcome, we can derive conditions on the preferred choices of different actors in particular situations. This allows us to solve the game by deriving conditions for sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, through the standard procedure of backwards induction.²² Since this solution process starts at the end of the game, we must begin by assuming whether or not the USA's implicit threat to respond to the TG's provocation is credible. We next have to impose conditions on the relative size of the parameters included in player G's preference orderings, and continue this process back to the beginning of the game tree. For reasons of space, only equilibria in pure strategies are considered and the details of these derivations are not included here.²³ As is typical for even modestly complex game models, multiple equilibria are possible under different circumstances.

Table 1 lists the combinations of conditions that need to be satisfied for all the possible pure strategy equilibria. Note that with the exception of $j=6$ (corresponding to the outcome where an unfunded aid program continues despite the partial blockage of associated proselytism operations), all outcomes are feasible as equilibrium under some conditions.

Figure 2 demarcates the equilibrium outcomes possible for different configurations of high, medium, or low values of the parameters n and p , which denote, respectively, the closeness of geopolitical interests between the two governments G and H and the extent to which public officials in G feel it necessary to protect the interests of the locally dominant religion. The prevalence of outcome 2, in which H's funded aid programs continue even though G has successfully limited F's missionary activities, for situations in which G is a close ally of H seems quite reasonable, given the extent to which geopolitical or economic concerns tend to outweigh any potential loss to H of support from domestic religious groups. Full-blown diplomatic incidents, represented in outcomes 1 or 5, are only possible when H has much less positive relations with G and when G has become closely allied with its own domestic religious forces.

The upper left hand cell of Figure 2, in which p takes on its largest values and n denotes a strongly antagonistic relationship between the two governments involved, is expanded in Figure 3, which shows how the more dangerous confrontations of outcome 1 are likely only if the FBO in question is highly committed to its missionary pursuits.

²² See Morrow (1994) and Gardner (2003) for accessible introductions to the basic concepts and analytical techniques of game theory.

²³ Paper copies of derivations as scribbled in my nearly illegible handwriting are available upon request.

Table 2 suggests how this mode of analysis might be extended in order to generate more specific predictions under particular combinations of circumstances. However, such an effort is difficult to justify unless we can be certain that each of the model's parameters can be measured with some validity. This remains a task for future research, and some potential leads are briefly mentioned below.

Finally, Table 3 suggests (in a tentative fashion) how the parameters of this model might be applied to explain the outcomes observed in the specific cases of faith-based diplomatic incidents with which this paper began. When Abdul Rahman was first converted to Christianity by aid groups supplying health care to Afghan refugees in Pakistan, the U.S. government was strongly committed to overthrowing the Soviet-sponsored regime, and as such was willing to overlook any proselytism that might have otherwise be seen as a diversion of attention from its primary geostrategic purpose. When he returned to Afghanistan in 2006, now under the direction of government propped up by the U.S., Rahman was acting as a private individual, and so that particular crisis does not quite fit the logic of the strategic narrative formalized in Figure 1. Even so, it was remarkable how quickly the Karzai regime effectively backtracked to acquiesce in his conversion, a situation made more palatable by his expulsion from the country.

In between Rahman's conversion experience and his tension-filled homecoming, the Curry-Mercer case tapped directly into a geostrategic matter of even more direct importance, namely, the U.S. effort to expel al-Quada forces from their strongholds in the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. In a time of war, even sanctions was not enough, as this case instead became entwined with ongoing military action and was carried to its logical conclusion in a direct confrontation between Taliban and opposition forces.

When criticism swirled around FBO efforts to evangelize Iraqis under US occupation or to evangelize tsunami orphans in Indonesia, the US quickly backed away from any connection with either operation, but for quite different reasons. The latter operation was of limited importance to U.S. strategic interests and the group in question had little direct contact to the U.S. in any event. Conversely, the outcome in the Iraqi case was too important for the U.S. to allow it to be undermined by the highly destabilizing proselytizing efforts of even those domestic groups closely associated with the Bush administration. Certainly many mistakes were made in the Iraqi operation, but at least this was not one of them.

Finally, the case of Sudan is listed as a diplomatic confrontation inspired primarily by humanitarian concerns. The government of Sudan, for example, has long supported militia

operations that force people living in oil-rich regions to flee to refugee camps, thereby making it easier for the government to profit from any oil production (see African Rights 1995). The US government has long sought to insure that the government of Sudan lives up to its commitment to allow aid organizations access to refugees from the south or from the Darfur region. Sudan has also been a “country of particular concern” from the initial report mandated by the 1998 IRFA. For reasons suggested below, Sudanese authorities have found it difficult to live up to their commitments to allow free access to victims of its own policies.²⁴ Thus, sanctions were virtually inevitable in this case.

6. Further Extensions

This analysis suggests that the recent institutionalization of yearly State Department reports on violations of religious freedoms may provide the basis for an increased frequency of diplomatic disputes on such matters. This report raises the profile on such issues and makes it more costly, especially in terms of potential losses of domestic support, for the US government to ignore the violations of religious rights by governments that it might otherwise want to treat in a positive fashion. The U.S. government can be expected to suffer more substantial and tangible costs in terms of lost domestic support whenever it refuses to act upon the incidents detailed in these official reports. In terms of this model, increases in k or R make conditions I and i more likely to be satisfied, thus moving the relevant point in the space denoted in Figure 2 further to the left, where diplomatic confrontations become feasible under a broader range of parameter values. Substantively, this information disclosure effect was one of the primary goals behind the mandating of such reports in the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (see Hertzke, 2006). In addition, these reports appear to have become more extensive, comprehensive, and professionally collected over the years (Grim and Finke, 2006).

Arguably, the Bush Administration has an additional reason to be sensitive to these concerns, given its strong base of support among religious conservatives. Even if the next inhabitant of the White House is less dependent on the support of religious conservatives, these

²⁴ This tendency was most noticeable with regard to the efforts of the government of Sudan to restrict access to internally displaced peoples in Darfur or, earlier, in the Nuba Mountains region or the southern region in general. Especially useful references on these three conflict regions within Sudan are Prunier 2005 on Darfur, African Rights 1995 and Pantuliano 2005 on the Nuba Mountains, and Aboum et al. 1990 and Prendergast 1997 on southern Sudan in general.

reports may continue to trigger and perpetuate diplomatic tensions. Thus, this topic promises to remain a point of practical interest for some time to come.

To use the model presented here as a basis for an evaluation of data on the frequency of disputes generated by government restrictions on humanitarian aid, political activism, and especially proselytism would require a more systematic formulation of the observable factors underlying the preference orderings postulated above. Several relevant data sets already exist that could be combined for this purpose.

FBO preferences can be grounded in the mutual influence of such explicit factors as the number of refugees generated by government policies who receive assistance and the overall level of aid flows and diversions. The number of converts will be especially important to examine proselytism games, and some measure of domestic unrest might be used to evaluate the consequences of FBO political activism. It may prove more difficult to operationalize the costs of confrontation and especially the costs entailed in violations of state sovereignty. Still, it should be possible to use empirical data to generate ordinal preferences for specific cases.²⁵

Clearly, much more work needs to be done to clarify the nature of strategic interactions between the agents of religious and political organizations. My preliminary analysis suggests that the faith-based organizations enjoy a surprisingly wide array of strategic advantages. First, they set the agenda to which governments and other political actors react. Because of the fundamentally distinct nature of religious motivations, FBOs engage in activities for their own reasons that have external effects on political conditions. Yet as long as the religious imperative behind these actions remains vital, political agents will be unable to dissuade FBO agents entirely, although they may affect some of their behavior on the margins. In this sense, FBO agents are only partially responsive to policy incentives. This does not mean that governmental manipulation is impossible, but it does impose a unique limitation in this area of public policy.

A second advantage comes from conditions conducive to the increased political influence of faith-based organizations, especially in the United States. FBOs are well-organized and able to lobby freely in their home countries, and many target governments lack the capacity to exclude them even if they wanted to do so.

²⁵ Grim (2005) and Grim and Finke (2006) report important recent innovations in data on government restrictions of religious freedom and on relationships between governments and dominant religions. Their data is based on systematic coding of the reports generated in response to the 1998 IRFA. Thus, their procedures may establish the baseline for the regular collection of updated data in future years. See also the extensive data on state regulations and other policies related to religion reported by Fox (2006).

Even when conditions are not propitious for religious expansion, faith-based organizations have demonstrated a remarkable ability to survive even the most repressive regimes. The survival of Catholic and Orthodox versions of Christianity in the countries of the former Communist Bloc is especially noteworthy, and Islam has become politically active throughout countries long under the domineering influence of Western countries. The situation of China remains uncertain, since religious activists can still not operate freely in that still-autocratic regime. All this suggests a third and more subtle advantage. Throughout history, some faith traditions have been strengthened by extensive campaigns of persecution. Despite the multitudinous capabilities of the modern state, it falls well short of the the capacity needed to snuff out religion.

What does this insulation from the threat of politically-generated extinction imply more generally? Perhaps religion, and the myriad faith-based organizations it continues to inspire, can serve as a check on the expansion of politics into more and more realms of human life. Faith-based organizations should claim their rightful position in a system of checks and balances more extensive than the political realm itself. That was certainly not the original inspiration behind any major religion, and it may never become an important consideration for many believers within any one faith tradition. Nonetheless, as political scientists and policy analysts we should come to a fuller appreciation of religion's critical role as an ultimate check on what otherwise be unbridled political power.

References

- About, Tabyiegen Agnes, Eshetu Chole, Koste Manibe, Larry Minear, Abdul Mohammed, Jennefer Sebstad, and Thomas G. Weiss. 1990. *A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan: A Report to the Aid Agencies*. Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group.
- African Rights. 1995. *Facing the Genocide: The Nuba of the Sudan*. London: African Rights.
- Ahmed, Eman. 2005. "A Dangerous Mix: Religion & Development Aid." WHRNet (Woman's Human Rights), July 2005, http://www.whrnet.org/fundamentalisms/docs/issue-aid_religion0507.html. Accessed October 12, 2006.
- Alkire, Sabina. 2001. "Religion and Development," prepared for David A. Clark, ed., *The Elgar Companion to Development Economics*, draft October 2004, available at <http://www.st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk/vhi/fis/rad.pdf>, Last visited August 31, 2005.
- Allen, Douglas W. 1995. "Order in the Church: A Property Rights Approach," *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 27, 97-117.
- Anderson, Mary. 1999. *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Appleby, R. Scott. 2000. *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Barnett, Mike. 2005a. "Creative Access Platforms: What Are They and Do We Need Them?," *Evangelical Missions Quarterly (EMQ)*, 41(1), January, 88-96.
- _____. 2005b. "Innovation in Mission Operations: Creative-Access Platforms," in Pocock et al. 2005, pp. 209-244.
- Beckford, James A. 2000. "'Start Together and Finish Together': Shifts in the Premises and Paradigms Underlying the Scientific Study of Religion," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 39 (4), 481-495.
- Belshaw, Deryke, Robert Calderisi, and Chris Sugden, eds. 2001. *Faith in Development: Partnership Between the World Bank and the Churches of Africa*. Oxford: Regnum Books/World Bank.
- Berger, Julia. 2003. "Religious Non-Governmental Organizations: An Exploratory Analysis," *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 14:1, 14-39.
- Bergner, Daniel. 2006. "The Call," *New York Times Magazine*, January 29, 2006.
- Berman, Harold J. 1998. "Freedom of Religion in Russia: An *Amicus* Brief for the Defendant," *Emory International Law Review* 12, 313-340.
- Bickers, Kenneth, and John T. Williams, 2001. *Public Policy Analysis: A Political Economy Approach*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Blumenthal, Max. 2003. "Onward Christian Soldiers," *Salon*, April 15, 2003. http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2003/04/15/in_touch/index_np.html. Accessed October 12, 2006.
- Boyd-MacMillan, Ronald. 2006. "Global Overview of Persecution," Open Doors UK, http://www.opendoorsuk.org/article_global_overview.php. Accessed October 12, 2006.
- Caldwell, Deborah. 2001. "Christian Jihad: Was the Taliban Right about the Real Agenda of Aid Workers Heather Mercer and Dayna Curry?," Belief Net, http://www.beliefnet.com/story/93/story_9373.html. Accessed October 12, 2006.
- Carter, Stephen. 1993. *The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion*. New York: Basic.
- Casey, Michael. 2005. "Tsunami Relief Efforts Mingle with Religion," *The Seattle Times*, January 14, 2005. http://seattletimes.nwsourc.com/html/nationworld/2002150723_faith14.html. Accessed October 12, 2006.
- Chaves, Mark. 2004. *Congregations in America*. Harvard University Press.
- Cooney, Daniel. 2006. "Afghan Christian May Face Death Penalty for Conversion," Associated Press, March 20, 2006. Posted at multiple sites, including <http://www.christianpost.com/article/missions/1994/section/afghan.christian.may.face.death.penal>

- <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7535-2005Jan13.html> and <http://www.washingtontimes.com/world/20060320-123722-5185r.htm>.
- Cooperman, Alan. 2005. "Tsunami Orphans Won't Be Sent to Christian Home," *Washington Post*, January 14, 2005. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7535-2005Jan13.html>. Accessed October 12, 2006.
- Cowan, Steven B., ed. 2004. *Who Runs the Church? Four Views on Church Government*. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.
- Cox, Brian, and Daniel Philpott. 2003. "Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly Emergent," *The Brandywine Review of Faith & International Affairs* Fall 2003, 31- 40.
- Cozad, Laurie. 2005. "The United States' Imposition of Religious Freedom: The International Religious Freedom Act and India," *India Review* 4, 1, (January), 59-83.
- Crawford, Sue E. S. and Elinor Ostrom. 1995. "A Grammar of Institutions." *American Political Science Review*, 89(3) (Sept.): 582-600. Reprinted in McGinnis (2000a).
- Danchin, Peter G. 2002-03. "U.S. Unilateralism and the International Protection of Religious Freedom: The Multilateral Alternative," *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 41, 33- 136.
- Demerath, N.J. III, Peter Dobkin Hall, Terry Schmitt, and Rhys H. Williams, editors. 1998. *Sacred Companies: Organizational Aspects of Religion and Religious Aspects of Organizations*, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dicklitch, Susan, and Heather Rice. 2004. "The Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) and Faith-Based NGO Aid to Africa," *Development in Practice* 14 (5), August 2004, 660-672.
- Dixon, David N. 2005. "Aid Workers or Evangelists, Charity or Conspiracy: Framing of Missionary Activity as a Function of International Alliances," *Journal of Media and Religion* 4(1), 13-25.
- Durham, W. Cole, Jr. 2001. "International Human Rights: The Protection of Religious Persuasion," *Fides et Libertas* 2001, 17-44.
- Ekelund, Robert B., Robert F. Hébert, Robert D. Tollison, Gary M. Anderson, and Audrey B. Davidson. 1996. *Sacred Trust: The Medieval Church as an Economic Firm*, New York: Oxford U. Press.
- Fore, Matthew L. 2002. "Shall Weigh Your God and You: Assessing the Imperialistic Implications of the International Religious Freedom Act in Muslim Countries," *Duke Law Journal* 52, 423-453.
- Fowler, Alan. 1999. *Striking a Balance: A Guide to Enhancing the Effectiveness of Non-Governmental Organizations in International Development*. London: Earthscan.
- Fox, Jonathan. 2006. "World Separation of Religion and State Into the 21st Century," *Comparative Political Studies* 39 (5), June 2006, 537-569.
- Freston, Paul. 2001. *Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa, and Latin America*. Cambridge University Press.
- Gardner, Roy. 2003. *Games for Business and Economics*. 2d ed. New York: Wiley.
- Gifford, Paul. 1993. *Christianity and Politics in Doe's Liberia*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- _____. 1998. *African Christianity: Its Public Role*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- _____. 2004. *Ghana's New Christianity: Pentecostalism in a Globalizing African Economy*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Gill, Anthony. 2005. "The Political Origins of Religious Liberty: A Theoretical Outline," *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion*, Volume 1, Article 1.
- Green, Joshua. 2001. "God's Foreign Policy," *Washington Monthly* November 2001. <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0111.green.html>. Accessed October 12, 2006.
- Grim, Brian J. 2005. *Religious Regulation's Impact on Religious Persecution: The Effects of De Facto and De Jure Religious Regulation*, Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, August 2005.
- Grim, Brian J., and Roger Finke. 2006. "International Religion Indexes: Government Regulation, Government Favoritism, and Social Regulation of Religion," *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion*, Volume 2, Article 1.
- Gunn, T. Jeremy. 2000. "A Preliminary Response to Criticisms of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998," *Brigham Young University Law Review* 841-865.

- Hackett, Rosalind I.J. 2003. "Human Rights: An Important and Challenging New Field for the Study of Religion," In *New Approaches to the Study of Religion* (eds. Geertz, Antes, and Warne, Mouton de Gruyter, 2003). <http://web.utk.edu/~rhackett/RELHR.END.FINAL.pdf>.
- Hackett, Rosalind I.J., Mark Silk, and Dennis Hoover, eds. 1999. *Religious Persecution as a U.S. Policy Issue*. Hartford, CN: Trinity College Center for the Study of Religion in Public Life.
- Hansen, Holger Bernt, and Michael Twaddle, eds. 2002. *Christian Missionaries and the State in the Third World* Oxford: James Currey and Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.
- Hearn, Julie. 2002. "The 'Invisible' NGO: US Evangelical Missions in Kenya," *Journal of Religion in Africa* 32 (1), 32-60.
- Helmick, Raymond G., and Rodney L. Petersen, eds. 2001. *Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy and Conflict Transformation*. Philadelphia, PA: Templeton Foundation Press.
- Hertzke, Allen D. 2004. *Freeing God's Children: The Unlikely Alliance for Global Human Rights*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Iannaccone, Laurence R. 1994. "Why Strict Churches are Strong," *American Journal of Sociology*, 99 (5), 1180-1211.
- _____. 1998. "Introduction to the Economics of Religion" *Journal of Economic Literature*, 36: 1465-1496.
- Innovative Minds. 2005. "Crusader Watch: Missionaries Preying on Tsunami Survivors," January 24, 2005. <http://www.inminds.co.uk/tsunami.html>. Accessed October 12, 2006.
- Jalen, Ted Gerald, and Clyde Wilcox, editors. 2002. *Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective: The One, the Few, and the Many*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jenkins, Philip. 2003. *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity*. Oxford Univ. Press.
- _____. 2004. "After The Next Christendom," *International Bulletin of Missionary Research*, 28:1, 20-22.
- _____. 2006. *The New Faces of Christianity: Believing the Bible in the Global South*. Oxford.
- Johnston, Douglas, ed. 2003. *Faith-Based Diplomacy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Johnston, Douglas, and Cynthia Sampson, eds. 1994. *Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kniss, Fred, and David Todd Campbell. 1997. "The Effect of Religious Orientation on International Relief and Development Organizations." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 36(1):93-103.
- Lampman, Jane. 2003. "A Crusade After All? Plans of Some Christians to Evangelize as They Offer Aid Pose Dilemma for Iraqi Reconstruction," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 17, 2003. <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0417/p14s01-lire.html>. Accessed October 12, 2006.
- Lauren, Paul Gordon. 2003. *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen*. 2nd edition. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Leege, David C. 2003. "Methodological Advances in the Study of American Religion and Politics," Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia.
- Lerner, Natan. 1998. "Proselytism, Change of Religion, and International Human Rights," *Emory International Law Review* 12, 477-561.
- Lindenberg, Marc, and Coralie Bryant. 2001. *Going Global: Transforming Relief and Development NGOs*. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.
- Loconte, Joseph. 2003. "Mission: Possible," *The Weekly Standard*, May 26, 2003. <http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed051903.cfm>. Accessed October 12, 2006.
- Macrae, Joanna, and Anthony B. Zwi, eds. 1994. *War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies*. London: Zed Books, in association with Save the Children Fund (UK).
- Manji, Firoze, and Carl O'Coill. 2002. "The Missionary Position: NGOs and Development in Africa," *International Affairs* 78 (3), 567-583.
- Mao, Wen, and Charles Zech. 2002. "Choices of Organizational Structures in Religious Organizations: A Game Theoretic Approach," *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 27, 55-70.
- March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1984. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *American Political Science Review*, 78: 734-749.
- _____. 1989. *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*. Free Press.


- Marshall, Katherine. 2001. "Development and Religion: A Different Lens on Development Debates," *Peabody Journal of Education*, 76 (3&4), 339-375; also available at World Faiths Development Dialogue, http://www.wfdd.org.uk/articles_talks/marshall.pdf.
- _____. 2005. "Africa: How and Why is Faith Important and Relevant for Development?," April 30, 2005. <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdc/marshall-africa.pdf>, Feb. 27, 2006.
- Marthoz, Jean-Paul, and Joseph Saunders. 2005. "Religion and the Human Rights Movement," *Human Rights Watch World Report 2005*, pp. 40-69.
- McCleary, Rachel M. 2004. "Taking God Overseas: Christian Private Voluntary Organizations in International Relief and Development." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, March 2004.
- McGinnis, Michael D. 1991. "Richardson, Rationality, and Restrictive Models of Arms Races," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, September 1991, 35:3, 443-473.
- _____. ed. 1999a. *Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis*, Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press.
- _____, ed. 1999b. *Polycentricity and Local Public Economies*, Univ. of Michigan Press.
- _____, ed. 2000. *Polycentric Games and Institutions*, University of Michigan Press.
- _____. 2000b. "Policy Substitutability in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: A Model of Individual Choice and International Response," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, No. 1, (February), 62-89.
- _____. 2004. "Faith-Based Multi-Functionality and Public Policy: An Initial Research Agenda," Colloquium on Environmental and Resource Economics, Humboldt University, Berlin, November 23, 2004. http://mypage.iu.edu/~mcginnis/humb_colloq.doc.
- _____. 2005. "Rebellion, Religion, and Rational Choice Institutionalism: Towards an Integrated Framework for Analysis," Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2005. <http://mypage.iu.edu/~mcginnis/rrci.doc>
- _____. 2006a. "Partners, Partisans, Proselytizers: Games Played by International Faith-Based Organizations," paper presented at the 64th Annual National Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 20-23, 2006. http://mypage.iu.edu/~mcginnis/ppp_midwest.pdf
- _____. 2006b. "From Self-Reliant Churches to Self-Governing Communities: Comparing the Indigenisation of Christianity and Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa," under review; revised version of paper presented at 47th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, March 22-25, 2006. <http://php.indiana.edu/~mcginnis/cria.doc>
- Mead, Walter Russell. 2006. "Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* September/October 2006, 85(5).
- Miller, Gary J. 1992. *Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- _____. 2005. "The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models," *Annual Review of Political Science* 8, 203-225.
- Miller, Kent D. 2002. "Competitive Strategies of Religious Organizations," *Strategic Management Journal* 23, 435-456.
- Morrow, James D. 1994. *Game Theory for Political Scientists*. Princeton University Press.
- Mueller, Dennis C. 2003. *Public Choice III*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- _____, ed. 1997. *Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook*, Cambridge University Press.
- Musa, Danladi. 2005. "The Local Church as Primary Development Agent," posted on the Tearfund International Learning Zone (TILZ) website, <http://tilz.tearfund.org/Topics/Church+and+Development.htm>, last visited 8/29/05.
- Ngunyi, Mutahi G. 1995. "Religious Institutions and Political Liberalisation in Kenya," in Peter Gibbon, ed., *Markets, Civil Society and Democracy in Kenya*, Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, pp. 121-177.
- Nichols, J. Bruce. 1988. *The Uneasy Alliance: Religion, Refugee Work, and U.S. Foreign Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Nurser, John S. 2005. *For All Peoples and All Nations: The Ecumenical Church and Human Rights*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- O’Keefe, Mark. 2003a. “Evangelicals Plan to Minister to Iraqis’ Needs – Physical and Spiritual,” *Christianity Today* (web-only), March 1, 2003. <http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2003/marchweb-only/3-24-45.0.html>. Accessed October 12, 2006.
- _____. 2003b. “Mixing Iraq Aid and the Gospel Stirs Debate,” *Christianity Today* (web-only), March 1, 2003. <http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2003/marchweb-only/3-31-52.0.html>. Accessed October 12, 2006.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- _____. 2005. *Understanding Institutional Diversity*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
- Pantuliano, Sara. 2005. “A ‘Principled’ Approach to Complex Emergencies: Testing a New Aid Delivery Model in the Nuba Mountains.” *Disasters* 29: S1, S52–S66.
- Pierce, John. 2003. “Secret Missionaries Draw New Scrutiny,” *Christian Century*, May 17, 2003. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1058/is_10_120/ai_102140702/print
- Pierson, Paul E. 2001. “The Rise of Christian Mission and Relief Agencies,” in Elliott Abrams, ed., *The Influence of Faith: Religious Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Landham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 153-170.
- Pocock, Michael, Gailyn van Rheenen, and Douglas McConnell. 2005. *The Changing Face of World Missions: Engaging Contemporary Issues and Trends*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker.
- Potter, Pitman B. 2003. “Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China,” *China Quarterly*, 174 (June), 317-337.
- Powell, Robert. 2002. “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 5, 1-30.
- Prendergast, John. 1997. *Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-Aids in Sudan and Somalia*. London and Chicago: Pluto Press; Washington, DC: Center of Concern.
- Prunier, Gérard. 2005. *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Richardson, James T., ed. 2004. *Regulating Religion: Case Studies from Around the Globe*. New York: Kluwer.
- Robert, Dana L. 1994. “From Missions to Mission to Beyond Missions: The Historiography of American Protestant Foreign Missions Since World War II,” *International Bulletin of Missionary Research* 18 (4), Oct. 1994, 146-160.
- _____. 2000. “Shifting Southward: Global Christianity Since 1945,” *International Bulletin of Missionary Research*, April 2000, pp. 50-58.
- _____. 2002. “The First Globalization: The Internationalization of the Protestant Missionary Movement Between the World Wars,” *International Bulletin of Missionary Research* April 2002, 50-66.
- Rogers, Melissa, moderator. 2003. *Ministering to Those in Need: The Rights and Wrongs of Missions and Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq*. Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, Event Transcript, June 4, 2003. <http://pewforum.org/events/index.php?EventID=46>. Accessed October 12, 2006.
- Rohde, David. 2005. “Mix of Quake Aid and Preaching Stirs Concern,” *New York Times* January 22, 2005. <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/22/international/worldspecial4/22preach.html?%2338;ei=5088&%2338;en=84b734c4c3df6ad9&ex=1264136400&pagewanted=print&position>. Accessed October 12, 2006.
- Sabatier, Paul A., ed. 1999. *Theories of the Policy Process*, Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Salamon, Lester M., ed. 2002. *The Tools of Governance: A Guide to the New Governance*. Oxford University Press.
- Scharpf, Fritz W. 1997. *Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Schirch, Lisa. 2005. *Ritual and Symbol in Peacebuilding*. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.
- Shea, Nona. 1997. *In the Lion’s Den: A Shocking Account of Persecution and Martyrdom of Christians Today & How We Should Respond*. Nashville, TN: Broadman & Hollman.

- Shepsle, Kenneth, and Mark S. Bonchek. 1997. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*, Norton.
- Sipress, Allan. 2005. "Christian Group Never Had Custody of Orphans," *Washington Post* January 15, 2005. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10647-2005Jan14.html>. Accessed October 12, 2006.
- Smith, Adam, [1776]. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, "Of the Expense of the Institutions for the Instruction of People of All Ages," Volume Two, Book V, Chapter 1, Article 3. Modern Library Edition, pp. 740-66; U. Chicago Press edition, ii, 309-38.
- Smith, Steven Rathgeb and Michael R. Sosin. 2001. "The Varieties of Faith-Related Agencies," *Public Administration Review*, 61:6, 651-670.
- Smock, David R., ed. 2002. *Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding*, Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Books.
- Sookhdeo, Patrick. 2005. "The Persecuted Church," Lausanne Occasional Paper (LOP) No. 32, Lausanne Committee for World Evangelization, www.lausanne.org.
- Stark, Rodney, and Roger Finke. 2000. *Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Sutton, John R., and Mark Chaves. 2004. "Explaining Schism in American Protestant Denominations, 1890-1990," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 43:2, 171-190.
- Tennant, Agnieszka. 2005. "First Waves of Relief," *Christianity Today*, February 2005. <http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2005/february/6.34.html>. Accessed October 12, 2006.
- Thomas, Scott M. 2004. "Faith and Foreign Aid: How the World Bank Got Religion, and Why It Matters," *The Brandywine Review of Faith & International Affairs* Fall 2004, 21-29.
- Tutu, Desmond. 1999. *No Future Without Forgiveness*. New York: Doubleday.
- U.S. Department of State. Yearly. *Annual Report. International Religious Freedom*. <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/>. Accessed October 12, 2006.
- USIP. 2001. *Faith-Based NGOs and International Peacebuilding*, Special Report October 22, 2001. www.usip.org
- Waldman, Steven. 2003. "Jesus in Baghdad: Why we Should Keep Graham out of Iraq," *Slate*, April 11, 2003. <http://www.slate.com/id/2081432/>. Accessed October 12, 2006.
- Witte, John, Jr. 2000. "A Primer on the Rights and Wrongs of Proselytism," *Fides et Libertas* 2000, 12-17.
- Witte, John, Jr., and Michael Bourdeaux, eds. 1999. *Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis.
- Wuthnow, Robert. 2004. *Saving America? Faith-Based Services and the Future of Civil Society*, Princeton.

Figure 1. Proselytism and Humanitarianism Game

Actors:
F Faith-Based Organization
G Target/Recipient Government
H Hegemon/Donor Gov. (USA)



Parameters:
 $A \gg a > 0, C \gg c > 0, R > 0, D > 0, 0 < b, v < 1$
 $0 < m < M, M \gg 1, 0 < p, k < 1, -1 < q, s, n < 1$

Utility Functions:
 $F = x + mz$
 $G = qx + y - pz - t$
 $H = sx - kw - nt$

Table 1. Equilibria in Pure Strategies

	I	i	II	ii	III	iii	Equilibrium Outcome
(a)	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	If $n < 0$, $j=1$; If $n > 0$, $j=5$
(b)	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	If $n < 0$ and VI, $j=1$; otherwise, $j=8$
(c)	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	If $n < 0$ and VII, $j=5$; otherwise, $j=4$
(d)	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no	$j=4$
(e)	yes	yes	no	yes		yes	If $n < 0$ and VII, $j=5$; otherwise, $j=3$
(f)	yes	yes	no	yes		no	$j=3$
(g)	yes	yes	no	no			$j=3$
(h)	no	yes		yes		yes	If IV, $j=2$; if not, $j=5$
(m)	no	yes		yes		no	If V, $j=2$; if not, $j=8$
(n)	no	yes		no			If V, $j=2$; if not, $j=7$
(p)	no	no					$j=2$

Conditions:

I $kR \geq nD + s(1-v)A$

i $kR \geq nd + s(1-v)a$

II $pbC \geq [q(1-v)+v]A + D$

ii $pbC \geq [q(1-v)+v]a + d$

III $m(1-b)C \geq (1-v)A$

iii $m(1-b)c \geq (1-v)a$

IV $A \geq [kR-nd]/[s(1-v)] \geq a$

V $kR \leq s(1-v)(A-a)$

VI $|n| \geq [s(1-v)a]/D$

VII $|n| \geq [s(1-v)A]/d$

Note: I implies i; II implies ii.

Outcomes (j)

1: Sanctions after Funding

2: Funded Aid but Blocked Proselytism

3: Funded Dual Program (Aid & Pros.)

4: Funded Aid Only

5: Sanctions without Funding

6: Unfunded Aid and Blocked Proselytism

7: Unfunded Dual Program (Aid & Pros.)

8: Unfunded; Aid Only

Figure 2. Space of Equilibrium Conditions

1 (Relig.)	II, ii	1 or 5,8,4 (See Fig. 3)	5 (if ~iii, ~IV) 8 (if iii, ~V) 2 Otherwise	2
p	ii, ~II	5 or 3	5 (if ~iii, ~IV) 8 (if iii, ~V) 2 Otherwise	2
(Secular) 0	~ii, ~II	3	2 (if V) 7 (if ~V)	2
		I, i -1 Enemy	i, ~I n Neutral	~i, ~I 1 Close Ally

**Figure 3. Expansion of Upper Left Corner Cell of Fig. 2
(Equilibria if Conditions I, II, i, ii Satisfied)**

iii	5 (for n<0 and VII); 4 otherwise	5 (for n>0); 1 (for n<0)
~iii	4	1 (for n<0 and VI); 8 otherwise
	~III	III

Table 2. How Parameter Values Affect Conditions

Condition:	<i>Parameter values for which that condition is more likely to be satisfied:</i>		
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Indeterminate</i>	<i>High</i>
I $kR \geq nD + s(1-v)A$	n,s; A,D		k,v; R
i $kR \geq nd + s(1-v)a$	n,s; a,d		k,v; R
II $pbC \geq [q(1-v)+v]A + D$	q; A,D		p,v,b; C
ii $pbc \geq [q(1-v)+v]a + d$	q; a,d		p,v,b; c
III $m(1-b)C \geq (1-v)A$	b; A		m,v; C
iii $m(1-b)c \geq (1-v)a$	b; a		m,v; c
IV $A \geq [kR-nd]/[s(1-v)] \geq a$	a	k,v; R n,s; d	A
V $kR \leq s(1-v)(A-a)$	k,v; a,R		s; A
VI $ n \geq [s(1-v)a]/D$	s; a		n negative; v; D
VII $ n \geq [s(1-v)A]/d$	s; A		n negative; v; d

Table 3. Approximate Parameter Values for Cases Discussed in Text

	Hegemon (U.S)	Target Govnt.	FBO	Conditions Likely to be Satisfied	Actual Outcome
Rahman conversion, aid to refugees from Soviet-ruled Afghanistan , 1990	High <i>s</i> , Low <i>k</i> , <i>Large negative n</i>	High <i>v</i> , <i>Low b</i> , Low <i>q</i> , <i>Low p</i>	High <i>m</i> , High <i>a,A</i> Low <i>c,C</i>	I ~II	3: Funded Dual Program (Aid & Proselytism)
Curry-Mercer vs. Taliban, Afghanistan , 2001	High <i>s</i> , High <i>k</i> , <i>Large negative n</i>	High <i>v</i> , High <i>b</i> , Low <i>q</i> , High <i>p</i>	High <i>m</i> , Low <i>a,c,C</i>	I	5: Sanctions Without Previous Funding
Samaritan's Purse, pre-U.S. Occupation of Iraq 2003	<i>High s</i> , High <i>k</i> , <i>Large positive n</i>	High <i>v</i> , Low <i>b</i> , Low <i>q</i> , High <i>p</i>	High <i>m</i> , High <i>A,C</i>	~I	2: Funded Aid, Blocked Proselytism
World Help tsunami relief, India & Indonesia , 2004-05	Low <i>s</i> , <i>Low k</i> , <i>Moderate positive n</i>	High <i>v</i> , High <i>b</i> , High <i>q</i> , High <i>p</i>	High <i>m</i> , High <i>a,c,C</i>	~I	2: Funded Aid, Blocked Proselytism
Rahman arrest, Karzai regime, Afghanistan , 2006	Low <i>s</i> , High <i>k</i> , Large positive <i>n</i>	High <i>v</i> , Low <i>b</i> , Low <i>q</i> , Low <i>p</i>	NA	NA	NA
IRFA reports on Sudan , 1999-2006	Low <i>w</i> , High <i>k</i> , <i>Large negative n</i>	High <i>v</i> , High <i>b</i> , Low <i>q</i> , High <i>p</i>	Low <i>m</i> , Low <i>a,A</i>	I	1: Sanctions After Funding Aid Programs

Note: Factors in italics expected to be significant determinants of which conditions are satisfied.