Political Science Y673

Political Order and Development: Macro

Spring Semester 1993

Meets Mondays, 3:30-5:30 PM
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis
513 N. Park

Seminar Leader: Michael McGinnis

Offices: 205 (513 N. Park), 356 Woodburn Hall
Office Hours: Thursday 9-11 AM (WH) and by appt.
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Schedule of Topics

This course is part of a two-semester introduction to an ongoing effort to build a multidisciplinary research program on political order, institutional analysis, and development. This year-long seminar constitutes the theoretical core for the more general intellectual exchange among scholars participating in the program for advanced study in the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. A fuller description of the theoretical and pedagogical foundations of this research program is included as part of this syllabus.

This year, the fall semester course focused on micro-level analyses of institutions and individual behavior, and the spring semester seminar focuses on macro-level perspectives on patterns of order in human societies. Particular emphasis will be placed on understanding interconnections among political, economic, and epistemic orders, as well as linkages among rule-ordered relationships at the operational, collective choice, and constitutional levels of analysis.

The material to be covered during this semester is organized into two major sections and a brief concluding section. In the first part of the semester we will focus on understanding the fundamental logic of alternative (or complementary) analytical perspectives on political order, specifically Hobbes' theory of sovereignty and the logic of polycentric order that underlies "the American experiment." We will also consider some aspects of economic order that are of particular importance to understanding political processes, especially the implications of "free markets" and "property rights." We will also examine (or re-examine) some of the classic statements of the logic of institutional analysis as it has been practiced by scholars associated with this Workshop.

In the second part of this course we move to an examination of a series of historical examples, focusing on their different patterns of interactions among the logics of political, economic, and epistemic orders. For some cases we will examine classic works, notably Tocqueville's Democracy in America and

Harold Berman's analysis of the origins of the western legal tradition. For other cases we will examine the results of research projects completed by students or visiting scholars associated with the Workshop: Yang on Imperial China, Kaminski on the recently concluded "Soviet experiment," and Amos Sawyer on Liberia. We will also consider the relevance of institutional analysis to Hedley's Bull's classic portrayal of an "international society" composed of "sovereign states" as well as some of my own preliminary efforts to come to terms with the nature of international order.

In the last two weeks of this seminar we will turn our attention to fundamental dilemmas that will continue to shape further developments in our understanding of institutional analysis. We will consider applications of the principles of institutional design to issues of economic development and ecological management, as well as some fundamental ontological and epistemological puzzles associated with any effort at policy analysis.

Given this breadth of material, it should be clear that this course serves as only a first introduction to a mode of analysis that has rich implications for many areas of political science and related disciplines.

Student Responsibilities

Students are expected to complete the reading assignments listed below before class, and to participate fully in class discussions. Each student will be expected to submit a short memo on each week's reading assignments. Each student will also submit an original research paper for presentation in a "mini-conference" format at the end of the semester. Some faculty members and visiting scholars will also present papers at this same mini-conference, as well as participate in seminar discussions. Copies of each paper will be distributed to all mini-conference participants. Approximately 40 minutes will be devoted to presentation and discussion of each paper: someone other than the author will be assigned the responsibility to present and comment on each paper, the author will have an opportunity to respond to these comments, and the remainder of the time will be available for general discussion of that paper and the more general issues it may raise. The seminar leader will assign a grade for each student's paper, which will be combined with grades for class participation (including the quality of the weekly memos) to determine the overall course grade.

In this semester we depart a bit from the Workshop tradition of distributing nearly all assigned course readings to all participants. Although copies of individual articles will still be distributed, this semester's reading list includes several books that are available for purchase at local bookstores. Copies of these books should also be available in the Workshop library (3rd floor) and in the Political Science Research Collection (200 Woodburn Hall). The following books have been ordered:

Berman, Harold J. Law and Revolution.
Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan.

North, Douglass. Structure and Change in Economic History.
Ostrom, Vincent. The Political Theory of a Compound Republic.
Ostrom, Vincent. The Meaning of American Federalism.
Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America.

Copies of the three other assigned books (Yang's dissertation and the books by Kaminski and Sawyer) will be provided to students at the appropriate time. Since our financial resources are limited, we would appreciate it if copies of these books are returned at the end of the semester.

Schedule of Discussion Topics and Reading Assignments

Week 1. January 11. Introduction to Seminar

PART I. ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS

Week 2. January 18. An Overview of Institutional Analysis

Searle, John (1969) "The Distinction Between Brute Facts and Institutional Facts." In Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. New York: Cambridge University Press, 50-53.

Ostrom, Vincent (1980) "Artisanship and Artifact." Public Administration Review 40(4) (July/August), 309-17.

Kiser, Larry L. and Elinor Ostrom (1982) "The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches." In Strategies of Political Inquiry, ed. Elinor Ostrom. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 179-222.

Ostrom, Elinor (1986) "An Agenda for the Study of Institutions." Public Choice 48: 3-25.

Week 3. January 25. Methodological Individualism and Hobbes' Theory of Sovereignty

Hobbes, Thomas ([1651] 1960) Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil. Michael Oakeshott, ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. [minimal reading: Introduction, Author's Introduction, chapters 1-19, 21, 24, 29-31, 39, 43, A Review and Conclusion]

Week 4. February 1. A Theory of Limited Constitutions

Ostrom, Vincent (1989) The Political Theory of a Compound Republic: Designing the American Experiment. 2nd ed. Lincoln: University of Alabama Press.

Week 5. February 8. Further Reflections on Alternative Logics of Political Order

Ostrom, Vincent (1991) The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing Society. San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.

Ostrom, Vincent (1988) "Cryptoimperialism, Predatory States, and Self-Governance." In Vincent Ostrom, David Feeny, and Hartmut Picht, editors. Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: Issues, Alternatives, and Choices, San Francisco, California: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 43-68.

Week 6. February 15. Property Rights and the "New Institutionalism"

North, Douglass (1981) Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton.

PART II. HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES

Week 7. February 22. Political, Economic, and Epistemic Order in Imperial China

Yang, T. S. (1987) Property Rights and Constitutional Order in Imperial China. Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, Dept. of Political Science.

Week 8. March 1. Multiple Legal Orders in Feudal and Early Modern Europe

Berman, Harold J. (1983) Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. [minimal readings: pp. 1-99, 113-123, 268-303, 333-363, 390-409, 516-538]

Edgar Kiser and Yoram Barzel (1991) "The Origins of Democracy in England," Rationality and Society, 3:396-422.

Week 9. March 8. "Sovereign States" and Other Aspects of International Order

Bull, Hedley (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. [minimal readings: Introduction, chaps. 1-3, 5 (pp. 101-112), 6, 8-11, 13 (297-301, 315-317), 14]

McGinnis, Michael (1990). "The Micro-Foundations of International Order: A

Preliminary Analysis," discussion paper.

SPRING BREAK

Week 10. March 22. An Evaluation of the Soviet Experiment

Kaminski, Antoni (1992) An Institutional Theory of Communist Regimes: Design, Function and Breakdown. San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.

Week 11. March 29. Foundations of the American Experiment

Tocqueville, Alexis de (1945) Democracy in America. New York: Knopf. Vol. I, Author's Introduction, Chapters 1-17.

Furet, Francois (1984) "The Conceptual System of `Democracy in America'," in In the Workshop of History, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Chapter 10, pp. 167-196.

Week 12. April 5. Future of the American Experiment

Tocqueville, Alexis de (1945) Democracy in America, New York: Knopf. Vol. II. Books 1, 2, and 4.

Week 13. April 12. An Example of African Autocracy: Liberia

Sawyer, Amos (1992) The Emergence of Autocracy in Liberia: Tragedy and Challenge. San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.

PART III. CONTINUING CHALLENGES

Week 14. April 19. Nested Institutions: Development and Environmental Issues

Michael McGinnis and Elinor Ostrom (1992) "Institutional Analysis and Global Climate Change: Design Principles for Robust International Regimes," pp. 45-85 in Marian Rice, Joel Snow, and Harold Jacobson, eds. Global Climate Change: Social and Economic Research Issues, Proceedings of a Conference held at Argonne National Laboratory, Chicago, Illinois, February 11-13, 1992.

Dele Olowu and James S. Wunsch (1990) "Conclusion: Self-Governance and African Development," in James S. Wunsch and Dele Olowu, eds., The Failure of the Centralized State, Boulder: Westview, Chapter 13, pp. 293-317.

Shui Yan Tang (1992) "Designing Complex Institutional Arrangements: Linking Bureaucratic and Local, Self-Governing Organizations," in Institutions and Collective Action: Self-Governance in Irrigation, San Francisco: ICS Press, Chapter 6, pp. 125-138.

Week 15. April 26. Continuing Dilemmas of Policy Analysis

Vincent Ostrom (1991) "Some Ontological and Epistemological Puzzles in Policy Analysis." Paper presented at the American Political Science Association meeting Washington, D.C., August 30.

Vincent Ostrom (1993) "The Place of Languages in the Political Economy of Life in Human Societies," Discussion paper D92-40, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington.

Mini-Conference Saturday, May 1 and Monday, May 3

INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT:
A COURSE OF STUDY

POLITICAL SCIENCE Y673 -- POLITICAL ORDER AND DEVELOPMENT

Monday, 3:30-5:30pm, 513 N. Park

I

GENERAL OVERVIEW

Institutions as Social Technologies or Social Capital

The focus of this seminar is upon how people relate to each other in ordered ways and how this, in turn, relates to development in human societies. We proceed on the assumptions that knowledge is essential in taking advantage of opportunities that may become available to human beings in the course of time. Most people are aware of the way that knowledge about physical and biological phenomena has made possible a wide range of technologies using new forms of energy to drive mechanical and electronic tools, and creating a wide variety of goods and services. Similarly, we can selectively breed different species of plants and animals which, when nurtured by an appropriate agriculture, yield supplies of food and fiber to meet the diverse demands of human populations. Genetic engineering promises new developments with both beneficial and harmful consequences.

Much less awareness exists with reference to the way that human social relationships affect potentials for development. These potentials can be realized only under certain conditions, and those conditions can be understood if we make the effort to do so. Advances in knowledge about human relationships are the basis for social technologies and are as important to development as knowledge in relation to physical and biological potentialities.

"Social technology" or "social capital," to use another expression (Coleman, 1988), refers to the way that human beings order their relationships with one another as they carry on activities and seek to accomplish tasks including those of producing, distributing, and using different goods and services and the way they organize exchange relationships. A plant, in the sense of an industrial facility, can be conceptualized as tools, machinery, and facilities (physical capital) that enter into a production process. Similarly, any organization, such as a business enterprise, or firm, can be viewed as the ordering of human activities and relationships that are necessary to the operation of a plant as a going concern. Social technologies represented by the ways that people order their relationships with one another, thus, are as essential to productive efforts as the physical or biological technologies that are represented by an industrial plant or a farm. We refer to all patterns of

ordered human relationships variously as being "organized" or "instituted." In our analytical language, organization and institution both refer to patterns of ordered human relationships.

Diverse Forms

No single form of organization can serve as an appropriate means for ordering all human social relationships. At the same time, different forms of organization may be available for performing similar tasks. Thus, our problem is to learn about both the capabilities and limitations that are inherent in different forms of organization. There are some fundamental similarities that apply to all organization, but the basic elements get put together in quite different ways, yielding varying opportunities and limitations. Variations in the patterns of organization can be expected to be correlated with the way that people come to use and enjoy different opportunities in their world of experience. All human societies have been required to come to terms with different ways of ordering social relationships as times have changed. As a result, human beings have a wide variety of experience with different patterns of organization. Alexis de Tocqueville, for example, refers to the "prodigious variety" of institutions to be found in human societies. By identifying what is universal in human experience we have the basis for reasoned calculations and rational choice about creating social forms instead of depending entirely on blind trial and error. Two or more persons can accomplish tasks that no one individual can achieve alone. But, there are different ways to organize teamwork; and these different ways afford varying opportunities for those who are involved.

Isolable Systems and Contextualities

Taking patterns of organization as an object of study necessarily presupposes that they can be treated as isolable systems. This needs to be done with caution. The way that particular institutional arrangements are linked together into larger configurations of relationships in any society needs to be taken into account in specifying any particular focus of analysis. Once this context can be specified with a recognition of the multiple levels of analysis that apply, there then exists the possibility that comparisons can be made of particular institutional arrangements across different social systems. Any particular organization exists in a specific space and time context that implies distinct uniquenesses. Yet, human beings confront problems that have underlying similarities and offer possibilities for a comparative analysis so long as we take appropriate account of similarities and differences. All human institutions are rule ordered: having rules implies rulers; and ruled: the "rule-ruler-ruled" condition. People's organizational behavior will reflect the way order is conceptualized, the place of rules in structuring relationships and how they are made binding.

All human understanding is subject to limits. Human beings do not have access to perfect information, nor can they know the truth. We must simplify

to understand, as economists do to make predictions about the economy. But as we simplify, we may lose understanding of the way that diverse institutions get linked together in complex configurations of organization. We may lose sight of diverse patterns in the general configuration of order existing in different societies. For example, in the social sciences and related fields we refer to the "state," using a term that glosses over the great variety that exists in the organization of rule-ruler-ruled relationships. Similarly, a generalized model of a market economy ignores the wide variety of arrangements that are possible for organizing market relationships and the complex configurations of market organizations that exist in a modern "market" economy. Markets in land are vastly different from markets for general merchandise or for "capital," and these markets are significantly different from labor markets if we can appropriately conceptualize labor as a "commodity." Yet, each of these sets of relationships and the way they relate to one another are important for patterns of development in any society.

Similarly, principles of bureaucratic organization are basic to business management, and public administration. But, as with teams, insufficient attention is given to variable patterns of coordination in complex structures of teams of teams. Superior-subordinate relationships in a hierarchical command structure are not the only way to achieve coordination in the public sector. This tendency to simplify can be carried to an extreme where all patterns of social relationships are viewed as being either market or state -- markets and hierarchies. Kinship structures, clans, voluntary associations, and community organization need to be conceptualized as having a fundamental place in the political economy of human societies.

Universals and Particulars

If we assume, as Hobbes has asserted, that there is a basic similitude of thoughts and passions that characterize all of mankind, there is a possibility that human inquiry can be used to develop a common method for understanding different institutions and configurations of relationships. Universals that apply to how people think and feel provide a common structure for understanding the great variability that applies to what particular thoughts and feelings people have about particular events. Variable patterns occur against a common background enabling people to understand by relating particulars to universals. This is not a simple task, but it should, with an appropriate appreciation of the difficulties involved, be tractable to human inquiry and understanding. This task would take account of the fact that people in different societies may act from different conceptualizations and would require thinking through the consequences for social organization that follow from different conceptualizations.

Since all modes of reasoning must be built upon some conceptual grounding, any effort to formulate a metatheoretical framework can be challenged with respect to the assumptions (a simplifying process) that are made as well as with respect to the basic elements that are taken into account and the activating principle or principles that are assumed to drive patterns of relationships. There is no way of resolving these issues except to understand them and to clarify the basic relationships between assumptions and implications and how these relate to the world of experience as conditions and consequences for order in human societies. It is easy to dismiss any set of ideas out of hand. Such a dismissal breaches further inquiry, reflection, and dialogue. As thinkers (homo sapiens), we bear the burden of clarification, reasoning through implications, and exchanging ideas with each other so that we can come to a better understanding of what is involved in the nature and constitution of order in human societies.

We advance understanding only when we clarify the grounds on which we stand. We have the possibility of deepening our own level of understanding as we are challenged and come to understand both the ground and the fuller implications of any challenge. By some such process human beings have over time created the relatively extended, productive, and organized cultures that exist today.

Since all human action is mediated by the voluntary nervous system, cognitive structures play a fundamental place in all patterns of action. Human interpersonal relationships depend upon shared expectations: common understanding. But, people may ground their shared community of understanding upon different presuppositions and conceptions. The question is whether all cognitive structures have equal merit or whether some are better than others. If such potentials exist, they can be considered only through reasoned exploration of possibilities and by experimentation.

Potentials for Error, Fantasy, and Frustration

The human imagination is the primary source of innovation. People can conceive of possibilities that have never existed before. This same imagination, as we are all aware, is capable of great flights of fantasy. People who experience high levels of frustration and anxiety are especially vulnerable to the promise of some utopia. This is greatly reinforced by social analyses that view different types of structural arrangements in human societies as ideal-type or nirvana models on the one hand or as diabolical machines on the other hand. All human institutions are subject to limits, and human societies require recourse to an array of different institutional arrangements if they are to take best advantages of available opportunities. Sources of institutional weaknesses and failure need to be subject to critical inquiry and understanding. Otherwise, people may "fall sacrifice of the ills of which they are ignorant" as Tocqueville has expressed the problem (1945, I: 231). We face the circumstance where reasoned calculations are necessary for fashioning order in human societies and where order in human societies is necessary to reasoned discourse. It may be difficult to create the circumstance where intelligible and critical discourse about the meaning of human experience can be achieved.

Institutions as Social Artifacts

Human social organization is to a major extent an artifactual creation grounded in the accumulated learning that becomes a part of the cultural tradition in any society. Human beings can be said to fashion their own social realities. The effect that each has in this process turns both upon the choices that individuals make and the voice that they exercise in collective decision-making processes. Social technologies, like other technologies, can be transmitted and acquired as people develop new ones. Machines can be shipped from one area of the world to another and their use, in a limited sense, need not depend on a general community of understanding of the principles upon which they are built. The same cannot be said of social technologies.

In dealing with institutions as social technologies we must recognize, with Amilcar Cabral, that people are the artisans who must fashion their own ways of structuring relationships to accomplish tasks and realize possibilities. We must build upon the common understanding and the shared experience of people in their particular circumstances. This is what Cabral meant by his plea to "return to the source" in building institutions that are appropriate to national liberation and development. They cannot hire social engineers to do the task as they might with machines. We can assume that people in all human societies have had experience in dealing with social problems. Understanding one way of addressing a particular type of problem lays the foundation for both clarifying the general nature of the problem and for considering alternative ways of coping with it. Institutions are social experiments that contain their own experimenters. The quality of an experiment can never transcend the capabilities of the experimenters. But, we should never underestimate the potentials that human beings have for

learning and for achieving what they conceive to be in their best interest.

Focus of the Seminar

Given these general considerations, this seminar on patterns of order and development in human societies will attempt to move to a general frame of analysis that is grounded in conditions that are assumed to apply universally among human beings. Responses to universal conditions may be highly variable. Where universal conditions might exist, we would expect them to be common to all human societies. We presume that it should be possible for human beings to engage in a meaningful inquiry about what is common and what is variable as among different societies. With patience, we should learn to communicate about both what is common and what is variable in human experience. Communication requires that we learn how to translate from one language system to another. That is not easy because the meaning assigned to words depends upon the shared experience of communicating with one another. For any language system there will always be implicit presuppositions about which people may not have a conscious awareness. Those presuppositions may be implicated in the language system of one culture; and different presuppositions may be used to give meaning to words used in a different culture. These problems are always inherent in translating from one language to another. The task of translation, while difficult, is assumed to be possible and that possibility is grounded in a presupposition that there is some basic "similitude of thoughts and passions," to use Thomas Hobbes's expression, that is universal among all mankind.

This implies that it is important to press one another in light of the variable circumstances existing in different societies so that we can move to deeper levels of understanding. This is greatly facilitated by having diverse

programs of inquiry that can be drawn upon as we pursue discussions in the seminar about the nature and constitution of order in human societies more generally.

Our task in the seminar will be to see how far we can go in developing such a mode of analysis, to challenge the grounds upon which it stands, and to see if we can move to more general levels of analysis. By drawing upon diverse intellectual traditions and upon diverse experiences in different societies, we might hope to advance our general understanding about the nature and constitution of order in human societies and what differences the structuring of human institutions makes for the way that human beings live their lives in different societies. It is only as we address ourselves to such levels of generality in light of the "prodigious variety" existing among different human societies that we can hope to establish satisfactory grounds for the study of human institutions. People in particular times and places draw upon resources, capabilities, and constraints to fashion institutional arrangements to pursue perceived opportunities giving rise to unique structures in each case. Success depends both upon a knowledge of universals and of the particulars that apply to specific exigencies.

A convergence of a great deal of scholarship from a variety of different intellectual disciplines promises a coherent, disciplined approach to problems of institutional analysis and design. Perhaps the major thrust has come from the application of the rudiments of "economic reasoning" to variable institutional structures. This thrust has occurred in efforts to study markets and nonmarket modes of organization associated with a transactions-cost approach, the study of public sector institutions associated with the public-choice approach, and to the study of institutions by anthropologists who have come to identify themselves as economic and ecological anthropologists and with studies in law and anthropology. Additional contributions are coming from game theory, especially on the part of those game theorists who rely upon the extensive form. Many contributions are also coming from scholars in organization theory and management science. These efforts, in turn, are consistent with earlier contributions from analytical jurisprudence. Much work in institutional analysis is being generated by a multidisciplinary group of scholars in law and economics. The Journal of Law and Economics is an important source of literature on institutional analysis. Economic historians are also making major contributions in their study of the development of institutions during different historical periods. The German tradition of Ordnungstheorie (theory of order) and the Austrian school of economics are also making important contributions to the study of economic systems as institutional orders. A great deal of earlier work in sociology, in institutional economics, and in political theory is based upon intellectual traditions that can be easily reconciled with the modern efforts to apply economic reasoning to institutions in both the private and public sectors. We are at a point where a coherent methodology in institutional analysis and development may provide us with tools of analysis to address more generally problems associated with social technologies and their place in the constitution of order in human societies.

The topics addressed in the seminar will explore an essential core of ideas that are assumed to be of interest to all members of the seminar. In addition, we assume that each participant in the seminar will be pursuing independent research interests related to some particular aspect of institutional analysis and design. We assume that most members of the seminar will be concerned with analyses of the way that institutional arrangements affect developmental potentials in their societies. We have much to learn from the diverse experience of different peoples; and we cannot assume that the advanced industrial societies offer the only route to development. We may learn from both failures and apparent successes in advanced industrial societies as well as from the failures and apparent successes that occur in other societies.

We need to find ways of developing a shared community of understanding about the way that particular research efforts are related to one another and to the basic core of ideas that are pursued in the regular sessions of the seminar. To do this, we need to rely upon supplementary modes of organization and complementary patterns of activities. The Workshop maintains a weekly colloquium that can serve as one forum for the articulation of ideas. We might also anticipate that complementary meetings might be scheduled to allow members of the seminar to pursue other intersecting interests. In particular, we normally use a conference format as a basis for reporting to one another at the conclusion of each semester's work. Presentations will draw upon particular issues that each person wishes to address in more basic detail as a result of the first semester's work.

Participants

Leadership in the seminar for the 1991-92 academic year will be shared by Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom. Patty Dalecki will be available to assist on the general use of Workshop facilities and the reproduction and availability of seminar materials.

Participants in the seminar come from diverse backgrounds of experience. We assume that each member of the seminar is a relatively mature scholar or professional who is capable of substantial initiative in pursuing his or her research and scholarly interests. Each will have much to contribute to the seminar as a joint undertaking. It is only as we can draw upon different disciplines and varied experiences that we can be expected to deepen our work in institutional analysis and design so that we might more adequately address patterns of order and development in human societies.

Working Procedures

In order to facilitate communication about ideas, we propose that regular patterns be established for writing notes or memoranda about a problem of interest, or criticism of some argument. Regular graduate students will be

expected to submit a short memorandum (4 or 5 pages) of this type each week during the first semester to Vincent Ostrom and to Elinor Ostrom during the second semester. These papers shall be due each Friday, prior to the meeting of the seminar on Monday afternoons. A written response will be given to each student each week. Other participants in the seminar are invited to prepare memoranda on points of interest, reflections, and issues that need to be pursued. These may variously be circulated to all members of the seminar or to anyone making seminar presentations on the assumption that he or she can help address the matter, and place it on the agenda for an appropriate discussion.

We assume that participants in the seminar will also find it productive to organize working groups where two or more who share interests in a common problem might develop working relationships with one another. We anticipate that drafts of research papers will be circulated among all seminar members, that some will be presented at Workshop colloquia, and that others will be related to continuing discussions in the core seminar.

We presume that all seminar participants will prepare papers for presentation in a conference format at the end of each semester. The focus of the conference at the end of the first semester will be on conceptualizing, designing, and explaining systems of governance in human societies. The focus of the conference at the end of the second semester will be more upon particular research papers that address specific problems in institutional analysis and development.

We hope that these procedures will facilitate mutually productive working arrangements that yield high quality work. We emphatically do not want our efforts to be routine assignments. Should anyone feel that working procedures have eroded into routine assignments, it is important that such feelings be articulated at an early juncture.

The Workshop has access to different types of computer facilities with both word processing and data processing capabilities. Efforts will be made to help each person acquire computer literacy and make use of these facilities in communicating with colleagues in the seminar.

Items listed as "essential readings" will be distributed to all members of the seminar. These are few in number and it is important that these be carefully read and considered before seminar meetings. Those listed as "related readings" are items of lesser priority and are available in reprint files. Patty Dalecki can provide access to these materials.

A small library collection of related materials is available in the seminar room and the Workshop library. Other library resources are available at the Main Library, the joint library of the Business School and the School of Public and Environmental Affairs, the Law Library, and the Research Collection in the Department of Political Science. Historically, the Economics Department was associated with the Business School. Their joint library was retained by the Business School. The Business School-SPEA library, as a result, is an important source of materials for the study of

human institutions. Charlotte Hess, the Workshop librarian, is a helpful source of information about library facilities on the Bloomington campus.

A variety of research papers and reprints are available in the Workshop that report upon prior research efforts. A collection of dissertations is available in the Colloquium Room. Several manuscripts, either in the process of publication or being considered for publication, have been reproduced. Copies are available for general use in the library. Arrangements can be made to procure individual copies for anyone wishing to give careful attention to any of these manuscripts.

Basic References

Each member of the seminar needs to give attention to the development of a personal library. We presume that all members of the seminar will have their own personal copies of Hobbes's Leviathan, Vincent Ostrom's The Meaning of American Federalism, and Tocqueville's Democracy in America. A list of books that we would recommend for your working library include the following:

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1987) The Organization of Local Public Economies. Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1988) Metropolitan Organization: The St. Louis Case. Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.

Ashby, W. Ross (1960) Design for a Brain. 2nd ed. New York: John Wiley (if available).

Bagehot, Walter (1964) The English Constitution. R.H.S. Crossman, ed. London: C. A. Watts.

Barry, Brian and Russell Hardin (1982) Rational Man and Irrational Society? An Introduction and Source Book. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Bates, Robert (1981) Markets and States in Tropical Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Berman, Harold J. (1983) Law and Revolution. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Buchanan, James and Gordon Tullock (1962) The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Commons, John R. (1957) Legal Foundations of Capitalism. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

de Soto, Hernando (1989) The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World. New York: Harper & Row.

Djilas, Milovan (1957) The New Class. New York: Praeger.

Eucken, Walter (1951) The Foundations of Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay, and James Madison (n.d.) The Federalist. New York: Modern Library.

Hardin, Russell (1982) Collective Action. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Hobbes, Thomas (1960) Leviathan. Michael Oakeshott, ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Holland, John H. (1975) Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Kaufmann, F. X., G. Majone, and V. Ostrom, eds. (1986) Guidance, Control, and Evaluation in the Public Sector. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Lachmann, Ludwig M. (1978) Capital and Its Structure. Menlo Park, California: Institute for Humane Studies.

Lenin, V. I. (1932) State and Revolution. New York: International Publishers.

Lenin, V. I. (1932) What Is To Be Done? New York: International Publishers.

Olson, Mancur (1965) The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Ordeshook, Peter C. (1986) Game Theory and Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ostrom, Elinor (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ostrom, Vincent (1991) The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing Society. San Francisco, CA: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.

Ostrom, Vincent (1989) The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration. 2nd ed. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press.

Ostrom, Vincent (1987) The Political Theory of a Compound Republic: Designing the American Experiment. 2nd ed. Lincoln: University of Alabama Press.

Pipes, Richard (1974) Russia Under the Old Regime. New York: Charles Scribner.

Popkin, Samuel (1979) The Rational Peasant. Berkeley: University of California Press.

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Please order the following texts for Political Science Y673 this spring semester.

10-15 copies?

All (except the last one listed) are in paperback editions.

I only need a desk copy of the books by North and Berman.

Thanks,

Mike

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, ISBN 0-02-065520-7. Collier Books, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1986.

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North, Douglass. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. ISBN 0-393-95241-X, New York: Norton, 1981.

Berman, Harold J. Law and Revolution. ISBN 0-674-51776-8, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.

Ostrom, Vincent, The Meaning of American Federalism, ISBN 1-55815-076-5. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies (ICS) Press, 1991.

Please check with Vincent on this last book. I understand that he has made an arrangement with the publisher to enable students to purchase the hardback edition at a reduced (paperback) price for class use.